Solving Frege's Puzzle by Heck, Richard
Solving Frege’s Puzzle∗
Richard G Heck, Jr
Abstract
Our actions are a product of mental states that represent how the world is, how
we want it to be, and so forth. Such is central to our conception of ourselves as ra-
tional agents. I suppose it is possible that this conception is simply wrong. Perhaps
there are, as eliminativists have argued, no such things as beliefs and desires. Or
perhaps there are, but these states are merely relations to uninterpreted formulae in
some internal computational system. I am going to set such questions aside here
and assume that our ordinary conception of our ourselves is not wholly mistaken.
The question I want to discuss concerns the role played in this conception by the
notion of representation, that is, by representational content. The question is: How
must we understand the contents of mental states such as beliefs and desires if
those states are to play the causal and explanatory roles envisaged for them?1
The question can be illustrated as follows. According to Frege (1984b, pp.
144–5), the reference of a sentence is its truth-value. Frege did not, however, take
the content of a sentence to be its truth-values and, relatedly, he did not regard
beliefs as relations between thinkers and truth-values. Such a view would widely
be regarded as patently absurd. But why?
One answer is that such an account fits poorly with our intuitions about the
truth-values of sentences that attribute beliefs. If beliefs were relations to truth-
values, it might be said, then “N believes that S” and “N believes that P” would
have the same truth-value whenever S and P had the same truth-value. Since each
of us surely has at least one belief that is true and one belief that is false, every sen-
tence of the form “N believes that S” would then be true. That does not accord with
intuition. But this is a poor sort of objection. There is no reason to suppose that our
∗A somewhat shortened version of this paper appeared in the Journal of Philosophy 109 (2012),
pp. 132–74.
1 The puzzle in which we’ll be interested can be formulated in various terms, and whether one
wants to think of it as concerning psychological explanation, intentional laws, or mental causation is
not, I think, critical for the discussion here. I’ll usually talk in terms of explanation, as that is how
I’ve tended to think of it myself, but I’ll speak in other terms when that seems convenient.
1
2‘folk’ conception of ourselves as rational agents will survive utterly unchanged as
our scientific conception of ourselves improves. Our everyday conception of be-
lief might have to undergo significant reconstruction, and our ‘intuitive’ judgments
might prove in many cases simply to be wrong. One might reply, of course, that
rather too many intuitions would then prove false for the ordinary conception just
to have been ‘reconstructed’. But the more important point is that we must not
confuse questions about the nature of belief with questions about the semantics of
belief-attribution. Questions of the former sort lie, ultimately, within the province
of cognitive psychology; questions of the latter sort lie within the province of the-
oretical linguistics. There is no reason to suppose that the semantics of ordinary
language belief-attributions must mirror the facts about belief itself: The scientific
notion of belief need not correspond precisely with the everyday one.2 But I need
not insist on this point. If there is just one concept of belief, then it is the ordinary
concept that figures in the work of cognitive psychologists, and there is no reason
to suppose that intuition is a particularly reliable guide to the truth-values of sen-
tences containing the verb ‘to believe’. You cannot do cognitive psychology from
the armchair.3 So either way, the conflict with intuition is irrelevant.
Now, to be sure, there are views that imply that questions about the nature of
belief cannot come apart from questions about the semantics of belief-attribution.
Such a conclusion would follow from any view that took the facts about belief to
be, in one way or another, but a reflection of our practices of belief-attribution.4
But such views will also be left out of account here: The question I want to discuss
arises, in the form in which I intend to discuss it, only for broadly realist views of
the mind.
What, then, is so obviously objectionable about the psycho-Fregean account of
belief as a relation to a truth-value? The answer, I suggest, is that, if beliefs were
relations to truth-values, then they could not do the explanatory work required of
them. Each of us would surely believe both the truth-values and so believe every-
2 One might be tempted to object that, since “Fred believes that snow is white” is true if, and only
if, Fred believes that snow is white, the facts about belief will impinge upon the semantics of ‘to
believe’ simply because the verb ‘to believe’ expresses the relation of belief. But this objection is
answered just as in the text. The crucial question is whether the verb ‘to believe’, as it occurs on the
right-hand side of the T-sentence, expresses the ordinary concept of belief or the scientific one. If the
former, the T-sentence is true but tells us nothing about belief itself; if the latter, it need not be true.
The point is simply that there is just no general reason to suppose that an utterance of “N believes
that S” can be true only if that utterance of S has the very same content as some belief of N’s. I’ve
discussed this point myself in connection with demonstratives (Heck, 2002), and related points have
been emphasized by Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore (1997).
3 I owe my full appreciation of its force to Noam Chomsky (2000).
4 I have in mind, for example, the views of Donald Davidson (1984b; 1984c). But any interpre-
tavist view—say, that of Daniel Dennett (1971)—will have a similar consequence.
3thing there is to believe. But if so, it is more than a little hard to see how my beliefs
could explain how I in fact behave as opposed to how anyone else behaves, since
we all have the same beliefs; or, perhaps more obviously, how my not behaving in
certain ways might be explained by my not having certain beliefs: Whatever those
beliefs might be, I do indeed have them. It is thus the explanatory purposes for
which beliefs are needed that rule out the psycho-Fregean view.
My concern here will be with an argument of the same form, but one whose tar-
get is not the psycho-Fregean view but the neo-Russellian view that the contents of
beliefs are Russellian propositions—or, more precisely, that the contents of beliefs
are individuated, so far as the objects the belief is about are concerned, only by
those objects themselves.5 Thus, on this view, the belief that Mark Twain lived in
Hartford has the same content as the belief that Samuel Clemens lived in Hartford.6
And let me emphasize that the view in which I am interested is the view that belief
is a binary relation between a cognitive agent and a Russellian proposition. This is
not a view that is widely held. Many philosophers hold views that lead them to say
(or write) things like, “The contents of beliefs are Russellian propositions”, when
their view is in fact that belief is a ternary relation between an agent, a Russellian
proposition, and something else, alternately known as a ‘guise’, a ‘mode of pre-
sentation’, or what have you. It is not at all clear why we should not say, on such
views, that the contents of beliefs are Russellian propositions plus ‘guises’, ‘modes
of presentation’, or what have you. Indeed, it is not clear why a similar maneuver
would not salvage the psycho-Fregean account: Perhaps belief is a ternary relation
between thinkers, truth-values, and modes of presentation. In any event, we shall
return to this issue in section 3.2, and to another form of it in section 4.
To avoid confusion, then, I will refer to the ‘pure’ Russellian view as the ‘naïve’
view.
The argument I want to consider, then, goes as follows. Suppose Fred reads
in the local paper that Clem Samuels has died. Clem, as it happens, was someone
Fred knew from around town, and, while Fred liked Clem well enough, he didn’t
really know him and so isn’t exactly devastated by this news, though it does sadden
him. Some time later, however, Fred hears from the local grocer that Sam Clemens
has died. Sam was an eccentric neighbor of Fred’s, someone of whom he really
was very fond. Fred knows already how badly he will miss Sam’s strange humor
and disarming smile. So Fred is really quite upset about Sam’s death.
The fact that Fred was not so upset before the grocer told him about Sam’s
death but is afterwards seems obviously to be a consequence of his not having
5 In fact, I’m no fan of structured Russellian propositions, but my reasons for unhappiness are
orthogonal to the issues here, so I shall set them aside.
6 ‘Mark Twain’ was a nautically-inspired nomme de plume used by the American author Samuel
Clemens, who did indeed live in Hartford, Connecticut, beginning in 1871.
4believed before what he did come to believe then, namely, that Sam Clemens
had died. And the naïve view need have no problem with this explanation. Sam
Clemens and Clem Samuels were two different people, so, by the naïve theorist’s
lights, there is no particular reason Fred couldn’t have believed that Clem had died
without also believing that Sam had died. So, in this respect, the naïve view is an
improvement on the psycho-Fregean view, which might have a problem even here.
But, of course, there are similar examples that do pose a problem for the naïve the-
ory. We need only suppose that the newspaper from which Fred learned of Clem’s
death also reported the death of Mark Twain and that Fred, though he knows some-
thing of literature and greatly admired Twain’s writing, also wouldn’t have been
personally affected by news of Twain’s death. But, familiarly, since Sam Clemens
was Mark Twain, the naïve theory implies that the belief that Sam Clemens has
died has the same content as the belief that Mark Twain has died so that, even be-
fore his conversation with the grocer, Fred did believe that Sam Clemens had died.
Now the obvious explanation of Fred’s change of mood must fail.
Such cases are of course known as Frege cases. They pose a problem for the
naïve theorist because s’he seems unable to offer any psychological explanation of
Fred’s change of affect. As Jerry Fodor puts it:7
. . . [D]e re specifications of propositional attitudes are generally too
weak to support explanations of behavior when the latter is intention-
ally characterized. So, de re, Oedipus’s desire to marry Jocasta = his
desire to marry his mother = his desire to marry the tallest woman in
Greece. . . . But it is only the first of these specifications of what Oedi-
pus desired. . . that figures in canonical explanations of the behavior
that Oedipus tried/intended to produce. (Fodor, 1982, p. 101)
To elaborate, let t1 be when Fred read “Mark Twain has died”; and let t2 be when the
grocer told him, “Sam Clemens has died”. The change in Fred’s mood that occurs
at t2 is plausibly due to some cognitive change Fred has undergone. Of course, it
need not be: There are all kinds of reasons Fred’s mood might have changed. But
the naïve theorist seems committed to the view that this particular change cannot
have been due to a cognitive change. What makes this so incredible is that it seems
to force us to give very different explanations of what would otherwise seem to
be very similar occurrences. Suppose, for example, that Fred had never read the
paper that morning and so had never read, “Mark Twain has died”. Then it would
be completely obvious that Fred’s change of mood at t2 was due to a cognitive
change: He came to believe that Sam Clemens had died. And, of course, it isn’t
Fred’s reading the paper per se that is responsible for the problem the naïve theorist
7 The particular beliefs Fodor discusses are perhaps not well chosen—the theory of descriptions
and all that—but let that pass.
5faces: If Fred had read the story about Clem but not the one about Twain, the
obvious explanation of Fred’s change of mood at t2 would still have been correct.
What is so perplexing, then, is why the fact that Fred did read the story about Twain
together with the fact that Mark Twain was Samuel Clemens should not only bar
the ordinary explanation of Fred’s change of mood but should bar any cognitive
explanation whatsoever.
The example I’ve just given concerns, as I have been saying, not a change
in Fred’s behavior but a change of affect. Other sorts of examples are of course
possible, however, including ones that would directly involve a change of behav-
ior, and there are also examples involving other sorts of psychological changes.
What all of these examples have in common is that, whatever sort of change might
be involved—affective, behavioral, or cognitive—we are ordinarily inclined to ex-
plain that change as the result of a change in what the agent believed, and the naïve
view seemingly will not permit any such explanation.8
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to exploring such arguments in
more detail. In the next section, we shall consider Fodor’s proposal that we should
simply deny that there is any cognitive explanation to be given in such cases—that
such cases are, in some sense, pathological. We shall see that this response is every
bit as desperate as it seems.9 In section 2, we’ll look at three ways of arguing that
the naïve view can offer a cognitive explanation of Fred’s change of mood, just not
the one we might have expected. We shall see that all of these are insufficiently
general: Each falls victim to a Frege case.
The central arguments of the paper are in section 3. I will first extract some
lessons from the preceding discussion and use them to argue that the naïve view is
indeed untenable: We simply cannot avoid the conclusion that Fred does acquire a
new belief when he hears from the grocer that Clemens has died. It does not, how-
ever, follow without further argument that this new belief has a different content
from the belief Fred previously held, that Twain has died, and I will suggest that
the naïve view can be resurrected in the form of a denial that these different beliefs
have different contents.
This sort of suggestion has been made before, but the problem has always been
that it is hard to see how this not-quite-so-naïve view might still provide us with a
cognitive explanation of Fred’s change of mood: Cognitive explanation is supposed
to be intentional explanation—explanation in terms of the contents of mental states,
as opposed (say) to their neurological properties—and it can easily look as if the
fact that Fred’s new belief has the same content as his old belief will prevent us
8 Yet another sort of example would involve changes in what the agent desires: Lex Luthor had
previously wanted to destroy Superman, but now he also wants to destroy Clark Kent—not because
he believes Clark is Superman but because he believes Clark is passing information to Superman.
9 Fodor tells me that he has since abandoned it.
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from giving any intentional explanation of his behavior. I shall argue that this
is an illusion. Much of that argument is contained in section 4, where we shall
consider a series of attempts to press the worry that no view that allows a thinker
to have different beliefs with the same content can prevent non-intentional features
of mental states from playing a significant explanatory role. Perhaps the most
important of these objections is the charge that the same moves I make in defense
of the naïve view could also be made in defense of the psycho-Fregean view. They
can of course be made—but not, I shall argue, effectively.
1 Biting the Bullet
The most radical response to Frege cases is the one Fodor defends in The Elm and
the Expert (1994):10 Deny that these kinds of examples really refute the naïve the-
ory. Fodor’s idea is that, since psychological laws are not exceptionless, perhaps
Frege cases are simply among the exceptions. But the difficutly is that, while there
is certainly room in logical space for this view, it is hard to see how it could actu-
ally be true. Psychological laws have exceptions, or so one might have supposed,
because psychological laws are not basic laws. Psychological states, that is to say,
are implemented by states of some more fundamental kind—neurological states, in
our case—and hiccups at the neurological level can therefore cause phenomena at
the psychological level that are, from the point of view of psychology, anomolous,
which is to say that they fall outside the domain of psychological explanation. So
the obvious way to construe Fodor’s suggestion is this: The very fact that someone
has two singular representations of a single object which she does not know to be
representations of a single object itself constitutes such a hiccup.
This suggestion is not overwhelmingly plausible. Fodor attempts to reinforce
it by arguing that there are mechanisms that will make such occurrences rare. In
response, Gabriel Segal (1997) has argued that there are no such mechanisms as
Fodor proposes. But I see no reason to suppose that Frege cases are at all unusual.
Imagine, for example, that I were sitting outside at a table in Harvard Square. As
people walk by, I am visually acquainted with them: I come to have, as Gareth
Evans would have put it, demonstrative thoughts about them. But who knows how
many of these people are also presented to me in other ways?11 I know many of
10 Susan Schneider (2005) has developed another version of this view, arguing that Frege cases
may be treated as ‘tolerable exceptions’ to a ceteris paribus law. Her view differs in detail from
Fodor’s, but I think it is still vulnerable to the objections raised here. That said, her view is in many
ways similar in spirit to mine. The central difference is that I do not need the idea that Frege cases
are, in any sense, exceptional. See note 33 for some further remarks.
11 In the course of presenting this paper, several Frege cases were generated: There were, each
time, at least a few people in the audience whom I’d not previously met but whose work I’d read, and
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my former colleagues by name though not by sight—and while one could debate
the frequency of the phenomenon, it hardly seems like the sort of thing that would
spring a ceteris paribus clause, thus making my behavior towards these people
psychologically inexplicable.
The more serious problem, however, is that Fodor’s response threatens to de-
prive us of the ability to give any psychological explanation whatsoever of my
coming to know, say, that the person walking down the street is Krister Stendahl.12
Such discoveries of identity are extremely common. A few weeks ago, for exam-
ple, I was looking outside the window of my study when I saw a cat who looked
very much like my cat, Joe. Joe is an indoor cat. But, as I realized after a minute
or two, that cat was Joe, who had apparently escaped to the great outdoors. In
so recognizing Joe, I was making an identity judgement: That creature—the one
presented to me visually, in such and such a way—is Joe. One can see that two
‘modes of presentation’ must be involved here by reflecting on the fact that I did
not originally recognize Joe, and the structure of the phenomenon would not have
been different had I recognized him immediately. Even if I had, I could intelligibly
have wondered whether that creature really was Joe.
The problem, then, is that, on Fodor’s view, my arriving at the identity judge-
ment that creature is Joe cannot be regarded as a psychological phenomenon ad-
mitting of a psychological explanation. But the discovery of such identities is
characteristic of object-recognition and so is an almost pervasive feature of human
cognition. It would be well beyond desperate to banish such recognition from the
realm of psychological explanation.
2 Variations on a Theme by Frege
The sort of argument we are considering here has, of course, been widely discussed
in the literature,13 but it is fair to say, I think, that few have wanted to defend the
naïve theory against it. There is a parallel debate in the philosophy of language,
though, and there the relevant analogue of the naïve theory—a naïve theory of
belief-attribution—has been vigorously defended.14 I’ve warned against conflating
so forth.
12 Similar worries are expressed by Jerome Wakefield (2002).
13 The classic discussions include those of Fodor (1982; 1994), McGinn (1982), Block (1986), and
Loar (1988b).
14 In fact, it isn’t always clear whether a particular author is discussing a thesis about belief or,
instead, a thesis about belief-attribution. Some people do not distinguish the two theses at all, or they
purposely run belief and belief-attribution together because they assume some strong connection be-
tween the two or, relatedly, between the contents of mental states and the contents of utterances.
For example, Block’s desiderata on an acceptable theory of content include both psychological and
linguistic elements (Block, 1986, pp. 616ff); McGinn, though he surely must have been aware of the
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these two sorts of issues, but one would nonetheless expect that at least some of
the moves and counter-moves that are made in the case of belief-attribution could
also be made in the case of belief itself. So what I propose to do in this section is
to adapt some of the arguments that have been offered in defense of neo-Russellian
accounts of belief-attribution and see how they fare when deployed in defense of
the naïve theory of belief itself.
In doing so, I am being unfaithful to the intentions of at least some of the au-
thors of these arguments. As David Braun emphasizes in “Russellianism and Ex-
planation” —we’ll focus on his discussion in section 2.1—most Russellians about
belief-attribution are not naïve theorists about belief (Braun, 2001, pp. 256–7).15
Rather, they regard belief itself as a ternary relation between an agent, a Russellian
proposition, and a way of taking (or grasping, or what have you) such a propo-
distinction, essentially ignores it (McGinn, 1982); and Loar, though in a sense his entire discussion
is concerned with this distinction between belief and attribution, obscures it through his emphasis on
“commonsense psychological explanation” (Loar, 1988b, p. 99, his emphasis). I am somewhat guilty
myself, and David Braun seems to have been misled by my sloppiness. He claims that I “explicitly
use [Frege cases] to argue against Russellianism” (Braun, 2001, p. 287, fn. 47), that is, against a
Russellian view about attitude ascriptions. But my concern in the passage Braun cites is not with
attitude ascriptions but with attitudes (Heck, 1995, pp. 79–80). I do not there “argue[] that, if Russel-
lianism were true, then attitude ascriptions could not be used to explain why certain agents. . . do not
behave in certain ways” (emphasis removed) but, rather, that, if the naïve theory were true, agents’
having certain attitudes would not explain their failing to behave in certain ways. That said, although
I emphasize that the issue “does not only concern intuitions about belief reports”, I then confuse mat-
ters by saying, much as Loar does, that what is at stake is “the status of everyday explanations of
behavior” (Heck, 1995, p. 80, fn. 4), by which I seem to mean the sorts of explanations that might
be given by ordinary speakers. If so, however, it might look as if what mattered was the truth of the
attributions made in the course of such explanations, whence the issue might well seem to be one
about semantics. That is not, in fact, what I had in mind: The paper as a whole is concerned with
the question how the contents of attitudes are related to the contents of sentences, and it purports to
uncover a tension in any view that marries a broadly Fregean account of the attitudes to a broadly
Russellian account of proper names. The point of the remarks Braun cites is pretty clearly to explain
why I took it to be relatively uncontroversial that Frege was right about the contents of belief even
though it is exceedingly controversial whether he was right about the contents of sentences. The
semantics of attitude ascriptions are hardly mentioned.
All of this is a good deal clearer in “Do Demonstratives Have Senses?” (Heck, 2002), to which
Braun would not then have had access.
15 There is a certain irony in this, since Russell himself most emphatically was a naïve theorist.
This point is sometimes obscured by the fact that Russell thought us capable of so few singular
thoughts. But where singular thought is possible, Russell insisted, the naïve theory is true. And,
indeed, the existence of Frege cases was one of the reasons Russell limited the extent of singular
thought as he did.
Since I am going to be fairly critical of Braun, let me say explicitly that his papers “Russellian-
ism and Explanation” (Braun, 2001) and “Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations” (Braun,
2000) are what inspired me to think more deeply than I previously had about how a naïve theorist
might respond to Frege cases—even though Braun’s papers are not really concerned with that issue.
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sition. Now, I certainly do not deny that this combination of views is available:
Since the metaphysics of belief is one thing and the semantics of belief-attribution
is another, it certainly is available. But it is too little noticed what a difficult po-
sition ordinary speakers would be in were such a combination of views correct. It
might well be, for example, that Fred’s becoming upset when he was told “Sam
Clemens has died” was due to some cognitive change he had undergone: He came
to have a new belief; that is, he came to stand in the belief-relation to a proposition
and a way of taking that proposition in which he had not stood before. Unfortu-
nately, the alleged facts about the semantics of attitude verbs (or, perhaps better,
about the semantics of complement clauses) would then prevent ordinary speakers
from reporting that such a change had occurred in the terms in which, as a matter
of obvious fact, they actually try to report such things: It would simply be false
to say “Fred then came to believe that Sam Clemens had died, whereas he had not
so believed beforehand”. And though it may well be that sentences that explic-
itly mention ways of taking propositions could be used in giving such explanations
(Braun, 2001, pp. 278–9), using such sentences would require knowing which ones
they were, and even we philosophers do not actually know how to mention ways of
taking propositions. Such sentences are well beyond the ken of ordinary speakers,
in any event. So, even if it is not inconsistent, the combination of a Russellian
view of attitude ascription and a ternary view about belief seems to me to border
on incoherent.16
More importantly, someone who holds this combination of views presumably
thinks that there are reasons to do so, that is, that there are reasons to endorse
a ternary metaphysics of belief. Braun does not say what those reasons are, but
the sort of argument most frequently given (and cited) is just the broadly Fregean
argument we are presently considering.17 That fact does not make Braun’s po-
sition inconsistent—facts about belief are, once again, different from facts about
belief-attribution—but it does make the position dialectically uncomfortable. If,
on the one hand, our adaptation of Braun’s response to Frege’s puzzle about belief-
attribution were to succeed, we would then be left without any good reason to
affirm the account of belief that Braun endorses; but if, on the other hand, our
adaptation failed, then the question would naturally arise whether Braun’s original
response did not suffer from analogues of the problems we would then have discov-
16 The obvious reply is that, although ordinary speakers cannot say that such a change has occurred
by uttering “Fred then came to believe. . . ”, they can communicate that such a change has occurred
by uttering this sentence. But can “Fred became upset at t2 because he then came to believe that
Clemens had died” be true if what follows “because” is false? Isn’t causal “because” factive? I’m
sure there are responses, but I still find the view incredible.
17 One widely cited discussion, for example, is Nathan Salmon’s, in Frege’s Puzzle (Salmon, 1986,
ch. 8).
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ered with the adapation.18 And most other philosophers who endorse a Russellian
treatment of the attitudes are in the same pickle.19
But however that may be, it is worth seeing whether one of the extant defenses
of neo-Russellian accounts of belief-attribution can be adapted to defend the naïve
theory of belief itself. The challenge, recall, is to identify the cognitive change in
Fred that is responsible for his change of mood when he is told “Sam Clemens has
died”. The naïve theorist cannot say that Fred then comes to have a belief with the
content Sam Clemens has died when he did not previously have a belief with that
content. But perhaps something else has changed.
2.1 The Braun Variation
David Braun’s suggestion (adapted to the case of belief) is that we should explain
Fred’s change of mood in terms of his having come to believe at t2 that his eccentric
neighbor has died, whereas he did not believe this at t1 (Braun, 2001, p. 277).20 The
naïve theory is clearly consistent with this claim.21
Before we discuss this suggestion further, I want to note an odd consequence of
it: If this response is adequate, then the crucial cognitive difference in Frege cases
must always lie in agents’ descriptive beliefs, since the naïve theorist can never
allow, in such a case, that there is a difference in the agents’ singular beliefs. Frege
cases are (real or hypothetical) situations in which we are inclined to explain some-
one’s behavior, or other mental states, by saying that, although s’he does believe
that F(a), s’he does not believe that F(b), even though a = b, which fact of course
prohibits the naïve theorist from endorsing this explanation. But—or so it seems
to me—if the agent’s singular beliefs do not explain her behavior in Frege cases,
then it is unclear how they can explain her behavior in non-Frege cases, either.22
Are we to say, for example, that it would have been appropriate to explain Fred’s
becoming so upset at t2 in terms of his then coming to believe that Sam Clemens
had died if he had not previously read “Mark Twain has died” but that, since he
did previously read “Mark Twain has died”, it is inappropriate to do so? I do not
say that such a view could not be ably defended. I do say that such a view is not
18 The adaptation will indeed fail—see section 2.1—and, so far as I can see, there is nothing to
prevent us from raising a parallel objection to Braun’s actual discussion of attribution.
19 To be sure, there is at least one way of responding to Fregean concerns about belief-attribution
that does not neatly transfer to the case of belief, namely, pragmatic responses. But these have their
own problems, as Braun (1998) shows. See note 16 for a bit more on this.
20 A similar view, directed at the case of belief, is found in Michael Thau’s Consciousness and
Cognition (2002).
21 Assuming, that is, that “his eccentric neighbor” is not a referring phrase but a definite description
to be treated a la Russell.
22 This kind of worry figures extensively in Segal’s writings on this issue (2000a; 2000b).
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likely to be true. If so, however, then the naïve theory, defended in the way we are
presently considering, feels a good deal more like Russell’s actual epistemology
than I would have supposed its proponents intended.23
But even if we waive that point, it is easy to see that the response we have
adapted from Braun will not deal with all Frege cases. We need only ask why
Fred comes to believe at t2 that his eccentric neighbor has died when he did not
so believe at t1. It is not as if it was because of a bump on the head. Fred’s being
told “Sam Clemens has died” is surely part of the story: Had the grocer instead
said, “We have apples on sale today”, Fred would not have come to believe that his
eccentric neighbor had died. Similarly, if Fred had not believed that Sam Clemens
was his eccentric neighbor, he would not have come to believe that his eccentric
neighbor had died, either. So both Fred’s pre-existing belief that Sam Clemens
was his eccentric neighbor and his being told “Sam Clemens has died” played a
role in Fred’s coming to believe that his eccentric neighbor had died. How do
these fit together? The obvious answer is that, when Fred was told “Sam Clemens
has died”, he came to believe that Sam Clemens had died, and then, knowing that
Sam Clemens was his eccentric neighbor, he inferred that his eccentric neighbor
had died. But this answer is obviously not available to the naïve theorist, since,
according to h’er, Fred already believed at t1 that Sam Clemens had died, and he
had believed all along that Sam Clemens was his eccentric neighbor.
As I mentioned earlier, many presentations of Frege cases focus on the expla-
nation of an agent’s behavior: Why doesn’t Sally, obsessed as she is with Rosalind
Smith, rush to get an autograph when she sees the sign announcing “Book Signing
with Joyce Carol Oates”?24 The case with which we began concerns a change of
affect: Why does Fred only become so upset when he is told “Sam Clemens has
died”? The case we’ve just discussed concerns a cognitive change, but it is other-
wise similar: Why does Fred only come to believe that his eccentric neighbor has
died when he is told “Sam Clemens has died”? So the objection I have raised here
is that the response adapted from Braun is insufficiently general: There are Frege
cases to which it simply does not apply. Worse, it generates a Frege case to which
it does not apply.
23 Later (see page 42), I shall discuss an objection to my own view that has a somewhat similar feel.
My response to that objection depends upon the assumption that Fred does acquire a new singular
belief when he is told “Clemens has died”, and the response we are adapting from Braun denies this.
24 This sort of example is due to Lewis (1986, pp. 58–9) and is discussed by Braun (2001, pp.
273ff) under the title “The Contrastive Explanation Objection”.
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2.2 The Meta-Linguistic Variation
Another option is to go meta-linguistic: When Fred is told “Sam Clemens has
died”, he comes to believe that the person named ‘Sam Clemens’ has died.
The immediate problem with this proposal, if we intend to adapt it to the
present context, is that it is far from obvious why Fred’s believing that the per-
son named ‘Sam Clemens’ has died should cause him to become so upset when his
believing that Sam Clemens had died did not. A similar question might have been
raised about Braun’s proposal, but a reasonable answer would also have been avail-
able: The story was that Fred would miss Sam’s odd humor and disarming smile,
and one might suggest that it is his neighbor’s humor and his neighbor’s smile that
he would miss—though this does, once again, raise the worry that the view being
defended is becoming more like that of the historical Russell than we might have
wanted it to be. No such response seems available in the present case, however.25
It isn’t as if Fred is particularly attached to the name ‘Samuel Clemens’.
It might be suggested, however, that we would get something more promising if
we were to weld the meta-linguistic response to Braun’s. What the meta-linguistic
proposal offers us, the thought might be, is an answer to the question why Fred
comes to believe at t2 that his eccentric neighbor has died: He infers that his neigh-
bor has died from his pre-existing belief that his neighbor is named ‘Sam Clemens’
together with his newly acquired belief that the person named ‘Sam Clemens’ has
died.
I suggest one last time that we are on our way to dispensing with any significant
role for singular thought in human cognition. But this maneouver doesn’t save
Braun’s proposal, anyway. The objection offered in the last section was that, if we
ask why Fred comes at t2 to believe that his neighbor has died, we get a Frege case
Braun’s proposal cannot handle. But we might just as well have asked a slightly
different question. Fred already believed at t1 that Sam Clemens was his eccentric
neighbor. So according to the naïve theory, he also believed at t1 that Mark Twain
was his eccentric neighbor. But it is uncontroversial that Fred believed at t1 that
Twain had died. So why didn’t he believe already at t1 that his neighbor had died?
The same sort of objection can be lodged against the meta-linguistic proposal.
The idea, recall, was that we should explain Fred’s change of mood at t2 in terms of
his then coming to believe that the person named ‘Sam Clemens’ had died. But we
can surely suppose that Fred knew already at t1 that Sam Clemens was named ‘Sam
Clemens’, and the naïve theorist is therefore committed to holding that he knew as
well that Mark Twain was named ‘Sam Clemens’. Fred then came to believe, at
t1, that Mark Twain had died. So why didn’t Fred believe already at t1 that the
25 Similar points have been made by William Taschek (1992, pp. 782–3).
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person named ‘Sam Clemens’ had died? This is just another Frege case, and the
meta-linguistic proposal cannot resolve it.
Two points about this argument. First, one might worry that it depends upon
some sort of closure principle, say, the assumption that, if Fred believes at t both
that p and that q, and if p and q together entail r, then Fred must also believe at t that
r; but it is surely not to be expected that people should believe all the consequences
of their beliefs, even the simple logical consequences.26 But I am not assuming
any such principle. It is not just that Fred does not infer at t1 that the person named
‘Sam Clemens’ has died, and it is not as if the reason he does not do so is that
he is psychologically incapable of considering all the premises of the inference
together. We can imagine that Fred, even while he is fully and consciously aware
that Mark Twain has died, is quietly wondering to himself whether the person
named ‘Sam Clemens’—who he is also fully and consciously aware is just Sam
Clemens—might also have died. Fred is in no position to infer that the person
named ‘Sam Clemens’ has died and, if he did so infer, his newly formed belief
would be unjustified, even irrational. What we lack, then, is any plausible account
of why Fred should have been unable to make this inference, rationally speaking.
Second, the argument does not depend upon the existence of any sort of con-
nection between explanation and generalization. It might seem otherwise.27 It
might, in particular, seem as if the argument depended upon the assumption that:
Given Fred’s pre-existing belief that Sam Clemens is his eccentric
neighbor, if what explains Fred’s coming to believe that his eccentric
neighbor has died is his coming to believe that Sam Clemens has died,
then, in general, if Fred comes to believe that Sam Clemens has died,
he will (at least be in a position to) come to believe that his eccentric
neighbor has died.
The naïve theorist might then insist that there is no such connection between ex-
planation and psychological generalization. But the argument I am developing
simply does not depend upon any such assumption. The crucial assumption in my
26 The contrary view has been held: That belief is closed under logical consequence follows from
the claim that the contents of beliefs are sets of metaphysically possible worlds. So see, for example,
Robert Stalnaker’s Inquiry (1984) and his two papers on logical omniscience (Stalnaker, 1999b,c)
for discussion. This view of course gives rise to problems not unlike those we are discussing here,
and it is a natural question whether the resources I deploy would not also be available to Stalnaker. I
shall discuss this point below (see page 46), where I argue that they are not.
27 The suggestion that it does is adapted from Braun (2001, p. 259). I am not sure whether Braun
himself would want to pursue this response in the present case, however, because the argument I am
developing here seems to be a form of what he calls the ‘Contrastive Explanation Objection’, against
which he does not deploy this kind of response, rather than a form of the ‘Ordinary Explanation
Objection’, where he does deploy it.
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argument is that, when Fred comes to believe at t2 that his eccentric neighbor has
died, his doing so is to be explained by his having undergone some other cognitive
change, and the question we are pursuing here is what other cognitive change the
naïve theorist can identify. One can deny this ‘crucial assumption’—deny, that is,
that Fred’s change of mind is due to some other cognitive change—but doing so
amounts to endorsing the response of Fodor’s we discussed in the section 1, and I
have already argued that Fodor’s response will not do.
2.3 The Soames Variation
As said, it is not as if Fred suffers from some psychiatric condition that isolates
his belief that Mark Twain has died from his belief that Sam Clemens is his eccen-
tric neighbor. But it might be suggested that Fred suffers from a different sort of
compartmentalization. Scott Soames (1987, pp. 221ff) makes precisely this kind
of suggestion in connection with belief-attribution: We should, Soames says, dis-
tinguish between an attribution of the two beliefs that a is F and that a is G and
an attribution of the single belief that a is both F and G. Adapting this suggestion
to our present concerns, then, a naïve theorist might suggest that, while Fred does
indeed believe at t1 both that Sam Clemens has died and that Sam Clemens is his
neighbor, he does not believe at t1 that Sam Clemens has died and is his neighbor.
The latter belief is one Fred only acquires at t2, and it is this belief that explains his
being so upset.
This idea could also be used to explain why Fred only comes to believe at t2 that
his neighbor has died. The thought would be that Fred can infer that his neighbor
has died only from a single belief of the form: N has died and is Fred’s neighbor,
not from distinct beliefs of the forms: N has died; and: N is Fred’s neighbor. And,
in principle, the view might also hope to avoid the other problems that beset the
earlier proposals. One might claim, for example, that it is Fred’s single belief that
Sam Clemens has died and is his neighbor that explains his being so upset—though
I, for one, would want to hear more about this. But it doesn’t really matter, since
this proposal too falls to a Frege case.
The obvious question to ask is why Fred comes at t2 to believe that Sam Clemens
has died and is his eccentric neighbor. Simply to say that Fred’s beliefs had pre-
viously been compartmentalized in some as yet unexplained way is no answer.
What led to Fred’s having the conjunctive belief was the grocer’s telling him “Sam
Clemens has died”. The obvious way to explain why he then comes to believe that
Sam Clemens has died and is his neighbor when he had not previously so believed
is in terms of his then coming to believe that Sam Clemens has died: He previously
believed that Sam Clemens was his neighbor; he came to believe that Sam Clemens
had died; and he made the obvious inference. So this is a Frege case: There is a
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change— a cognitive change, in this case—that we are inclined to explain in terms
of Fred’s coming to believe that F(b), but he had antecedently believed that F(a),
so, since a = b, the naïve theorist is prohibited from endorsing this explanation.
A different way to press the same point is as follows. Consider Fred at t1 and
suppose with the Soames-inspired naïve theorist that Fred believes both that Sam
Clemens has died and that Sam Clemens is his neighbor but does not believe that
Sam Clemens has died and is his neighbor. Question: What needs to happen for
Fred to get himself into a position to acquire this latter belief? Of course, Fred
might learn directly that Sam Clemens has died and is his neighbor. Someone
might tell him precisely that. But surely that is not the only way Fred might arrive
at this belief, and in the present case it would seem to be Fred’s being told “Sam
Clemens has died” that did the trick. But how?28 There are plenty of cases in which
someone who knows that a is F acquires the new information that a is G and all but
simultaneously acquires the new information that a is both F and G. And then there
are the cases in which the latter information is not only not simultaneously acquired
but seems to be wholly unavailable. What is the difference between these two sorts
of cases? It is not, again, as if the difference is due to a serotonin imbalance. The
difference is cognitive, and the problem for the naïve theorist is that there seems to
be no cognitive difference between such situations that she can identify.
There is really a more basic question to be asked, namely, how we are supposed
to understand the inference from the two beliefs that N is F and that N is G to the
single belief that N is both F and G.29 Under what circumstances will such an
inference will be available to a thinker? The sort of explanation we have borrowed
from Soames obviously will not help us answer that question. But if we knew
when such inferences were available, then we would not need the Soames-inspired
28 In principle, of course, one could mix and match the three responses we are discussing: One
might say that some Frege cases are to be resolved Braun’s way, some via semantic ascent, and some
Soames’s way. But mixing and matching doesn’t seem to help here. For example, one could try
saying that it is because Fred came to believe at t2 that the person named ‘Sam Clemens’ had died
that he then came to believe that Sam Clemens had died and was his neighbor. But it will then be
asked why Fred did not previously know that the person named ‘Sam Clemens’ had died. Is the
answer that, though Fred knew both that Clemens was named ‘Clemens’ and that Clemens had died,
he did not know that Clemens was named ‘Clemens’ and had died? But then, what would he have
had to learn to acquire this last bit of knowledge? Once again, his being told “Clemens has died” is
what seems to have done the trick, but it’s entirely unclear how.
29 Such inferences have to be possible: We cannot simply make do with single-premise inferences.
But the problem isn’t limited to multi-premise inferences. We need to understand when, say, the
inference from N is F to N is either F or G is valid, that is, when the premise and conclusion are
‘appropriately related’. Fred believes that Twain is an author. So why can’t he conclude that Clemens
is either an author or a spy and then, since he is firmly convinced that Clemens is not a spy, infer that
Clemens is an author? Indeed, the problem arises just with the inference from ‘Twain is an author’
to ‘Clemens is an author’. But now I’m getting ahead of myself.
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machinery. The work it does would already be done by our account of when the
belief that N is F and the belief that N is G were so related that this sort of inference
was possible. For example, we would not need to say that Fred can infer that his
eccentric neighbor has died only from the single belief that Sam Clemens has died
and is his neighbor but, rather, that he can make this inference when the two beliefs
that Sam Clemens has died and that Sam Clemens is his neighbor are appropriately
related and cannot make it otherwise. But nothing we have yet seen gives us any
indication what it might be for these beliefs to be ‘appropriately related’.
2.4 Frege on ‘Proper Knowledge’
In the next section, we shall consider a further reply on behalf of the naïve theorist,
one that is not vulnerable to variations on what should now be a familiar Fregean
theme. Before we do so, however, it is worth pausing to note that we are now in
a position to offer a reasonable interpretation of one of Frege’s more enigmatic
remarks on these issues.
In “On Sense and Reference”, Frege famously argues against an account of
identity-statements that regards them as expressing meta-linguistic claims to the
effect that the names occurring in the statement have the same reference.30 Frege’s
argument is this:
. . . [T]his relation would hold between the names or signs only in so far
as they named or designated something. It would be mediated by the
connection of each of the two signs with the same designated thing.
But this is arbitrary. Nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrary
producible event or object as a sign for something. In that case, the
sentence a = b would no longer refer to the subject matter, but only
to its mode of designation; we would express no proper knowledge by
its means. (Frege, 1984c, p. 157, original p. 26)
What does Frege mean by ‘proper knowledge’?
David Kaplan has suggested, plausibly enough, that what Frege means is knowl-
edge about the world, in particular, non-linguistic knowledge—except in those
special cases where linguistic items are clearly at issue [[FIXME: REF]]. Frege
is insisting, for example, that the sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorous” expresses
astronomical knowledge, not just knowledge about names. But someone might
reasonably reply, it seems to me, that “‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ co-refer”
does express astronomical knowledge since, after all, both ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phos-
phorous’ refer to heavenly bodies.
30 This interpretation has been challenged by Michael Thau and Ben Caplan (2001). I am not
convinced (Heck, 2003).
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I do not know how Frege would have answered this objection, but the following
reply falls out of our discussion. Consider Fred again. Fred is largely ignorant of
astronomy, but he does at least know that ‘Hesperus’ refers to Hesperus and that
‘Phosphorous’ refers to Phosphorous.31 According to the naïve theory, then, Fred
also knows that ‘Hesperus’ refers to Phosphorous. Now, to be sure, it does not
follow that Fred knows (or even believes) that both ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’
refer to Phosphorous, so it does not follow that Fred knows (or even believes)
that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ co-refer. But it’s not as if Fred doesn’t have
these beliefs because he hasn’t gotten around to making certain obvious inferences.
It is rather that Fred seems to be in no position to make the relevant inferences.
The question worth asking is thus what Fred would need to learn before he could
make the inference in question and so arrive at these beliefs. Or, to put the point
differently, and in a way somewhat more reminiscent of Frege’s own language:
How can we represent the discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorous as a scientific
achievement?
I don’t myself know how Pythagoras discovered that Hesperus and Phospho-
rous are one and the same. But here is one possibility. Perhaps Pythagoras was
able to plot the positions of both of them reasonably accurately and then realized
that the position his calculations predicted Hesperus would occupy at some time t
was the same as the position predicted for Phosphorous at t. But the naïve theorist
cannot endorse this explanation. For suppose Pythagoras had completed his cal-
culations concerning Hesperus and so knew that Hesperus would be at location l
at time t. According to the naïve theorist, Pythagoras therefore knew as well that
Phosphorous would be at location l at time t. Why, then, did he need to do another
set of calculations? One might suggest applying Soames’s suggestion to this case:
Perhaps we should say that what Pythagoras needed to know was that both Hespe-
rus and Phosphorous would be at l at t but that all he would have known, had he
not done additional calculations, was that Heperus would be at l at t and that Phos-
phorous would be at l at t. But how does doing the additional set of calculations
help? One would ordinarily have supposed that it was only after doing the second
set of calculations that Pythagoras knew that Phosphorous would be at l at t. But,
of course, the naïve theorist cannot agree.32
31 One might be tempted to deny Fred even this knowledge, claiming that he does not really know
that ‘Hesperus’ refers to Hesperus but only that ‘Hesperus’ refers to the object to which ‘Hesperus’
refers. But I can see no way of defending this view except by denying Fred any knowledge of objects
that is not mediated by the expressions he uses to refer to them, so that Fred doesn’t really know that
Hesperus is far away, either, only that the object to which ‘Hesperus’ refers is far away. But that,
once again, is just a form of Russell’s epistemology, one that makes the descriptions through which
we know the world meta-linguistic.
32 And even waiving that point, surely Pythagoras did know after doing the first set of calculations
that both Hesperus and Hesperus would be at l at t. But then, according to the naïve theorist, he
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So the problem at which Frege was gesturing, I suggest, is that there seems
to be no way for the naïve theorist to explain, in broadly cognitive terms, how
Pythagoras might have arrived at his discovery nor why, when he did, it might have
counted as rational, justified, or knowledgable.
3 Solving Frege’s Puzzle
In the previous section, we considered a variety of responses on behalf of the naïve
theorist to the challenge posed by Frege cases. All of these were frustrated by es-
sentially the same problem, namely, that we have no way to insulate Fred’s beliefs
about Sam Clemens from his beliefs about Mark Twain—for example, to insulate
his belief that Clemens is his eccentric neighbor from his belief that Twain has
died. As noted in section 2.3, it is tempting to say that these beliefs are compart-
mentalized somehow, but they are not compartmentalized in any familiar sense:
Fred can perfectly well have his belief that Mark Twain has died firmly in mind
and simultaneously be wondering whether Sam Clemens has died. Or again: Fred
can simultaneously be thinking that Mark Twain has died and that, if Sam Clemens
has died, then p, without having any inclination whatsoever to conclude that p—
and, more importantly, while correctly regarding any belief at which he might so
arrive as irrational and unjustified.
The question the naïve theorist is unable to answer is what cognitive change
Fred undergoes when he is told “Sam Clemens has died”, that being the cognitive
change that is responsible for his becoming upset. The responses examined earlier
all deny what one is otherwise inclined to say, namely, that when Fred is told
“Sam Clemens has died”, he comes to have a new belief, a belief I shall henceforth
describe—for want of better language—as the belief that Sam Clemens has died.
I suggest, therefore, that the lesson we must draw from our discussion so far is
that we simply cannot avoid this conclusion: Fred’s belief that Clemens has died
is a new belief, in which case it is also a different belief from his previously held
belief that Mark Twain has died. If so, however, belief cannot simply be a relation
between a thinker and a Russellian proposition. The naïve theory of belief is false.
What follows, then, will not constitute a defense of the naïve theory of belief.
What I am going to argue, rather, is that there is nothing to the contents of beliefs
beyond a Russellian proposition. And I will argue further that, whatever more there
is to the intrinsic nature of a particular belief beyond its relating a thinker to a Rus-
sellian proposition, this additional material does not play any role in psychological
explanation. The view I shall defend, that is to say, has two parts:.
already knew that both Hesperus and Phosphorous would be at l at t, and he was wasting his time.
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1. What distinguishes the belief that Clemens has died from the belief that
Twain has died is nothing intensional. In particular, these beliefs have the
same content.
2. If we are to be able to explain Fred’s behavior in cognitive terms, there must
be some difference between these beliefs that plays a role in psychologi-
cal explanation. But no intrinsic difference between these beliefs plays that
role. The explanatorily relevant difference is an extrinsic, relational one. It
concerns how these beliefs are related to other of Fred’s beliefs.
This, I suggest, is as close to the naïve theory as it is possible to get once it has been
conceded that a single thinker can have distinct beliefs with the same Russellian
content. So I shall continue to speak of the ‘naïve theory’, but the naïve theorist
shall henceforth be defending the position just described rather than the original
form of the naïve theory.
Let us start with the question whether the position I intend to defend is even
available. For a long time, I thought there was a very short argument to the con-
clusion that it is not. Since Fred’s belief that Mark Twain has died and his belief
that Sam Clemens has died are different beliefs, they must have different contents,
whence the contents must be individuated more finely than Russellian propositions
are. This move is an extremely natural one, often tacitly made. What lies behind
it, it seems to me, is the thought that beliefs just are relations between thinkers and
contents. And what lies behind that thought, I suggest, is the view that psycho-
logical explanation (in the sense in which we are concerned with it) is intentional
explanation, that is, explanation in terms of the contents of psychological states as
opposed, say, to the neurological properties of such states.33 Consider, for exam-
ple, the following remarks by Brian Loar:
By psychological content I shall mean whatever individuates beliefs
and other propositional attitudes in commonsense psychological ex-
planation, so that they explanatorily interact with each other and with
other factors such as perception in familiar ways. (Loar, 1988b, p. 99;
see also pp. 103, 105, and 197, fn. 8)
[Psychological content] is that content-like aspect of thoughts, of how
we conceive things, by reference to which we consider whether com-
33 Schneider discusses at some length why one might suppose that differences of the sort at issue
here must be due to differences of content (Schneider, 2005, §4). She does not, however, discuss
the worry that what she calls ‘computational explanation’, since it isn’t intentional explanation, isn’t
psychological explanation and so fails to make Fred’s behavior intelligible as that of a rational agent.
I think this is the really serious worry—I think it’s what’s bothering Fodor, too—and nothing Schnei-
der says even begins to address it.
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binations of them are rational, whether they motivate a given belief or
action, and so on. (Loar, 1988a, p. 127, emphasis removed)
The thought, I take it, is that it is all but analytic of the notion of psychological
content that the causal and explanatory properties of a belief (qua belief) are de-
termined by its content. If so, however, then it would seem to be impossible for
Fred’s belief that Mark Twain has died and his belief that Sam Clemens has died to
be different beliefs with the same content. These beliefs are differently implicated
in psychological explanations of Fred’s behavior.34 If they have the same content,
however, then we cannot answer the question “whether they motivate a given belief
or action” (Loar, 1988a, p. 127) simply in terms of their content. How beliefs and
other psychological states “explanatorily interact[ed]” (Loar, 1988b, p. 99) would
therefore depend upon more than just their content, and psychological explanation
could not proceed simply with reference to the intentional features of psychological
states but would have to advert to at least some of their non-intentional properties.
Or, as Fodor puts a closely related point: It would seem to follow that psycholog-
ical laws cannot subsume psychological states simply in virtue of their having the
contents they do but must make reference to some other features of those states.
And that would be tantamount to denying that psychological laws are intentional
in the relevant sense (Fodor 1994, ch. 1, esp. pp. 22–3; compare Fodor 1982, pp.
100–2).
I am now inclined to resist this line of argument, however, or, rather, to resist
the conclusion I was previously inclined to draw from it. We do, indeed, have to
allow that psychological explanation needs to make reference to features of mental
states beyond their content, if content is construed as the naïve theorist would have
us construe it. But I will argue that this concession, in the form in which it has to
be made, is far less threatening than it has seemed it must be.
3.1 Sense and Psychological Explanation
Before I continue, though, I want to suggest that the problem here may be one with
which Fregeans too have to struggle: A parallel problem would arise for Fregeans
if it were possible for a thinker to have two different beliefs with the same Fregean
thought as their contents.35 Now, to be sure, Fregeans have generally regarded it
34 To deny this—that the beliefs are differently implicated in psychological explanations—would
be to endorse the bullet-biting response considered and rejected in section 1.
35 Other examples familiar from the literature can be seen as suggesting a similar conclusion. So-
called Mates cases (Mates, 1952) are often so understood. And Paderewski cases seem originally
to have been intended to cast doubt upon Fregean accounts, since they suggest that someone could
understand two different expressions that had the same sense and so both believe and fail to believe a
single Fregean thought (Kripke, 1976). Both arguments assume, however, that the notion of sense is
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as a constraint on an acceptable theory of sense that this should not be possible,
but it is one thing to have a constraint and another to have a theory that actually
meets that constraint. And so far as I can see, the only theory that has any chance
of meeting it is one we do not want.
Consider the view defended by Christopher Peacocke in A Study of Concepts
(1992). On this view, the content of a concept is fixed by the possession conditions
associated with that concept, and typical possession conditions will make reference
only to a small subset of the inferences in which a given concept might be involved.
To possess the concept of disjunction, for example, one need only be inclined to re-
gard inferences that have the form of the usual introduction- and elimination-rules
for disjunction36 as ‘primitively compelling’ and to do so because the inferences
have that very form. Now suppose that there were a language that contained two
symbols, ∨ and g, both of which satisfied the truth-table for disjunction. Then
the mere existence of these different symbols seems to imply that someone might
believe what s’he would express using A∨B but not what she would express using
AgB.37 And so far as I can see, that is quite compatible with the assumption that
the concepts expressed by the two symbols share a possession condition, namely,
the one just mentioned. If so, however, then Peacocke seems to be committed to the
claim that these two symbols would express the very same concept, and speakers
of this language could have different beliefs—those expressed by A∨B and AgB,
respectively—that had the very same content.
It is tempting to appeal here to the following technical fact: Given any two
symbols ◦ and • both of which satisfy the usual introduction- and elimination-rules
for disjunction, we can prove, in general, that they are equivalent, in the sense that,
given any two sentences A and B, we can prove A◦B≡ A•B.38 The idea would be
that anyone who satisfied the possession conditions for both ∨ and g would have
to realize that they were equivalent and so would never actually believe that A∨B
but not that AgB—except, perhaps, in the uninteresting case in which she simply
closely tied to public language (see Dummett, 1978), and that can be denied—as, in fact, it routinely
is. For a bit more on this, see note 42.
36 These are the rules A ` A∨ B and B ` A∨ B together with the disjunctive syllogism: From
Γ,A `C, ∆,B `C, and Θ ` A∨B, conclude Γ,∆,Θ `C. It does not, of course, matter whether these
are the right rules. The sort of worry expressed in the text will arise no matter what they might be.
37 I.e., you can get Paderewski cases here, too.
38 One might, indeed, require that a set of inference rules satisfy this condition if they are to deter-
mine a concept. As is now well-known, some such restrictions are required: One does not want to
suppose that an arbitrary set of rules determines a concept, since some such sets are inconsistent.
The technical situation here is more subtle than is usually recognized. There are ways of combin-
ing constants from different logics that prevent the sort of ‘collapse’ mentioned in the text. One now
familiar method is by ‘fibring’ (Gabbay, 1998). Josh Schechter has developed another, in work as
yet unpublished. The point does not affect the present discussion, but it definitely affects other uses
to which collapse results have been put.
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hadn’t bothered to draw the relevant inference.39 But there are several problems
with this suggestion. First, the proof that A∨B≡ AgB, while not exactly difficult,
is not utterly trivial, either. (Exercise!) That A∨B ≡ AgB therefore seems like
something one could discover—and the point of using that word is to emphasize
that the Fregean will then have the same sort of obligation in this case that the
naïve theorist has in Frege cases, namely, an obligation to offer a psychological
account of this discovery. Second, it is important to understand that the ‘proof’ of
which I’ve been speaking is meta-theoretic. It is a proof schema that encapsulates
a method for constructing a proof of A∨B ≡ AgB, given any sentences A and B.
The meta-theoretic proof therefore licenses us to conclude that, for all sentences A
and B, A∨B is equivalent to AgB. But the meta-theoretic proof, and so the meta-
theoretic conclusion, need not be available to the ordinary thinker who possesses
the concepts expressed by ∨ and g: No capacity for meta-theoretic reasoning (or,
if you prefer, schematic reasoning) is required for possession of such concepts.
The ordinary thinker, then, need not even be able to entertain the thought that A∨B
is always equivalent to AgB. The ordinary thinker is therefore not in the same
position we theorists are: Knowing the meta-theoretic result, we might reasonably
regard ∨ and g as mere synonyms; but the ordinary thinker need not know the
meta-theoretic result nor, as I said, even be able to entertain it.
One common reaction to this kind of problem is to say that such a thinker would
have only an incomplete grasp of the concepts expressed by ∨ and g. Perhaps that
is correct. But if it is, that only means that, if possession conditions fully determine
the intentional properties of a belief, there must be more to the identity of a belief
than is determined by its intentional properties.40 But then the Fregean has, as I
said, the same problem the naïve theorist has.
The one theory that might avoid this conclusion is a radically holistic concep-
tual role semantics—radically holistic in the sense that the content of a belief is
only individuated by all the inferential relations in which it stands. It is the rad-
ically holistic element of the view that gives this theory a chance: If absolutely
all of the inferential connections matter, then, plausibly enough, there would be at
least one such difference between any two of a thinker’s beliefs.41 For the same
reason, however, content, so individuated, will almost never be shared. And the
39 It’s worth noting that this sort of response isn’t at all available on Peacocke’s new view (1998),
according to which what individuates sense may involve principles that are not consciously but only
tacitly known.
40 Another option, in principle, would be to concede that the intentional properties of a belief are
not determined by its content. But that is not in the spirit of Peacocke’s position.
41 Perhaps even this radically holistic view will not do: One can imagine certain sorts of symmetry,
so that the beliefs would differ only in their inferential relations to one another. And then the contents
differ only, so to speak, in so far as they are different.
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problem with that result is not, as often seems to be supposed, that sense must be
shared because sense is somehow essentially connected with language.42 Nor is
it simply that psychological laws will almost never have more than one instance,
whence there will be almost no common explanations to be given of different peo-
ple’s behavior.43 It is, rather, that intentional laws then will not have the sort of
generallity we ordinarily suppose they do. One would have supposed, for example,
that the explanation we give of why Fred became so upset when the grocer told
him, “Sam Clemens has died”, would still have applied even if, say, Fred had not
believed that Clemens once lived in Missouri. Indeed, we find ourselves wanting
to say: Fred would still have been upset even if he had not believed that Clemens
once lived in Missouri because he still would have had the other mental states that
caused him to become upset, such as the belief that Clemens was his neighbor. But
on the radically holistic view, we can’t say that. Fred would not then have had the
same beliefs he now has; in particular, he would not have had the belief he now
expresses as “Clemens is my eccentric neighbor” but, rather, a different belief he
would then have expressed the same way. This is just a consequence of the fact
that, on the radically holistic view, absolutely every inference in which a belief
figures is partially determinative of its content. Psychological explanation would
then not support the right sorts of counterfactuals. And that is why we do not want
to radically holistic view.
3.2 Crypto-Fregean Views of Belief
I have argued that we cannot avoid the conclusion that there are two different men-
tal states in which Fred might find himself, one that would constitute his believing
(as we are putting it) that Mark Twain has died and one that would constitute his
believing that Sam Clemens has died. The question is whether we can make this
concession without also conceding that content must be individuated more finely
than by Russellian propositions.
42 Thus, the relation between the meanings of expressions and the contents of mental states is a
dominant theme in John Perry’s now classic paper “Frege on Demonstratives” (1993). More re-
cently, William Taschek claims that an acceptable notion of sense must “support not only our usual
assessment of the consistency, inconsistency, and the like of sentences as used by the same person,
but also such assessments as they concern sentences used by different people” (Taschek, 1998, p.
330). My own view, for what it is worth, is that the notion of sense, for Frege, is primarily a cog-
nitive notion and that it is a bold, and ultimately untenable, thesis that this same notion is fit to do
serious work in the philosophy of language (Heck, 1995, 2002).
43 Fodor, of course, has been making this point for decades (Fodor, 1987, p. 57). I remember
recently seeing a paper specifically replying to it, but I can’t now seem to find it. The point made in
this reply was that, even if the law has only one instance, it could still be general in the sense that
it would apply to any agent whose beliefs had the appropriate sorts of contents. But I think Fodor’s
point was always more the one that follows.
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As I mentioned earlier (see page 8), few of those who have wanted to defend
broadly Russellian accounts of belief-ascription have wanted to defend the naïve
theory of belief itself. Rather, the common wisdom is that belief is a three-place
relation between an agent, a proposition,44 and something else. There is no agree-
ment about what this third thing should be called let alone about what precisely it
might be. Some writers regard it as something akin to a linguistic meaning—David
Kaplan’s (1978) character or John Perry’s (1993) role, perhaps—and some regard
it as a kind of representation, perhaps a sentence of natural language or a mental
representation.45 There does seem to be agreement, however, that adopting such a
view is a way of avoiding a commitment to anything like Fregean senses. One thus
regularly finds proponents of such views denying that the third term, whatever it is,
is an aspect of content and, similarly, insisting that the content of a belief is simply
a proposition. So we would do well to consider whether the naïve theorist might
simply adopt some such view in response to Frege cases.
That depends. Let me first distinguish what I shall call ‘crypto-Fregean’ views
from what I shall call ‘representationalist’ views. A ternary conception of belief
is representationalist if the third term of the relation is some sort of representation
that is individuated in wholly non-intensional terms. If, on the other hand, the third
term is individuated at least partly in intensional terms, then the view is crypto-
Fregean. What I want to do in this section is to justify the label ‘crypto-Fregean’:
To adopt such a view is, contrary to what most of their defenders seem to intend,
not to endorse an alternative to Frege’s view that belief is a two-place relation
between an agent and a ‘thought’ but rather to adopt a particular version of that
view. Representationalist views will be discussed in the next section.
Let me speak, henceforth, of the third term of the relation as a ‘way of think-
ing’, just to settle terminology. So crypto-Fregeans hold that belief is a relation
between a thinker, a proposition, and a way of thinking of that proposition.
The first point that needs to be made is that ways of thinking of propositions are
not what are needed here (Heck, 1995, p. 80, fn. 5). Consider again the question
why Fred comes to believe that his eccentric neighbor has died. Insisting that belief
is not a binary but a ternary relation does put us in a position to resist the claim that,
since Fred already at t1 had beliefs with the contents that Sam Clemens had died
and that Sam Clemens was his neighbor, he ought then to have been in a position
44 I shall henceforth drop the modifier ‘Russellian’ and use the term ‘proposition’ just to mean:
Russellian proposition.
45 Many writers just aren’t terribly clear about what the third term is supposed to be, which of
course leaves them no worse off than Frege, whose remarks on modes of presentation are infamously
cursory. And the distinction that I’m trying to make is rarely in the foreground, so people do not
always locate themselves with respect to it. But Braun, Perry, and Salmon all seem to me to be
crypto-Fregeans; Mark Richard (1990) is a clear representationalist.
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to infer that his neighbor had died: We need only insist that the relevant inference
could not be made from the latter belief and the belief that involved thinking of the
proposition that Sam Clemens had died in way τ1 but only from the latter belief
and the belief that involved thinking of that proposition in way τ2. But why can the
inference be made in the second case? Why is τ2 the right way and τ1 the wrong
way? The natural thing to say—indeed, the only thing to say, so far as I can see—
is that the inference can be made when, and only when, Fred is thinking of Sam
Clemens the same way both times. So it is not ways of thinking of propositions but
ways of thinking of objects that we need.
The problem becomes more acute when we consider beliefs involving relations.
Consider, for example, a belief with the content that Mark Twain was taller than
George Orwell. How this belief interacts with other beliefs—say, one with the
content that George Orwell was taller than Joyce Carol Oates—will depend upon
how the agent thinks of both terms of these relations. No inference will be possible
unless s’he thinks of Orwell the same way both times. And which belief results
from the inference will depend upon how s’he thinks of Twain and Oates: S’he
might arrive at the belief we can describe as the belief that Twain was taller than
Oates; s’he might arrive at the belief that Clemens was taller than Rosamond Smith;
and so forth.
To account for all the logical relations between beliefs involving singular rep-
resentations, then, we shall need to regard the third term of the relation of belief
not as a way of thinking of a proposition but as a collection of ways of thinking
of the terms of the proposition. But then it is unclear why we should not simply
regard belief as a two-term relation between agents and what we might call ‘pre-
sented propositions’, which can be taken to be complexes consisting of objects,
properties, and the ways in which these entities are presented. But as Gareth Evans
(1985, §VI) insisted, this view is very much in the spirit of Frege’s. To be sure, no
such view need incorporate all of Frege’s views about sense. In particular, there is
no need for a view of this sort to regard ‘ways of thinking’ as wholly independent
of reference, as ‘determining’ reference in some strong sense.46 But then, Evans
himself was inclined to abandon these aspects of Frege’s view, and he certainly
thought himself a Fregean.
Just how close such a view is to Frege’s will depend upon how one understands
ways of thinking, in particular, upon how similar ways of thinking, so understood,
are to Fregean senses. Fortunately, however, we do not need to resolve such ques-
tions for our purposes. The question here is whether the intentional properties
46 Then again, Braun writes that “an agent stands in the believing or desiring relation to a proposi-
tion in virtue of standing in another psychological relation to an intermediary entity that determines
the proposition that the agent believes or desires” (Braun, 2001, p. 256), so he actually seems to
endorse this aspect of Frege’s view.
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of beliefs are individuated more finely than by Russellian propositions, where the
intentional properties in question are all and only those that play a role in psycho-
logical explanation, and it is clear enough that crypto-Fregean views regard ways
of thinking as playing just such a role. So crypto-Fregean views cannot help the
naïve theorist.
3.3 Representationalist Theories of Belief
And so, again: We must allow that Fred’s belief that Mark Twain has died and his
belief that Sam Clemens has died are different beliefs. Can we nonetheless regard
them as having the same content? The obstacle to our doing so, recall, is that we
would then seem to be committed to the view that the psychological role played
by a particular belief is not determined by its content. So the first question to ask
is how our allowing that these two beliefs are different might help us explain why
Fred becomes upset only when the grocer tells him “Sam Clemens has died”. The
answer must surely be that it is only the belief that Sam Clemens has died that is
disposed to cause Fred to become upset, and it is is only when the grocer tells him
“Sam Clemens has died” that he comes to have that belief. When Fred reads “Mark
Twain has died”, on the other hand, he comes to have the belief that Mark Twain
has died, not the belief that Sam Clemens has died. Thus, these two states stand,
as was suggested, in different relations to other of Fred’s mental states.
Consider now the question why Fred did not already believe at t1 that his neigh-
bor had died. The answer will have to involve the fact that, just as the belief that
Twain has died is different from the belief that Clemens has died, so the belief
that Clemens is Fred’s neighbor is different from the belief that Twain is Fred’s
neighbor. And though Fred did have both the belief that Twain had died and the
belief that Clemens was his neighbor at t1, he did not then have either the belief
that Clemens had died or the belief that Twain was his neighbor. Why, though,
should that be enough to explain why Fred was in no position at t1 to infer that his
neighbor had died? The language we are using to describe these beliefs may make
such a conclusion seem natural, but it cannot license it.
How do things look from a Fregean point of view? Frege would have us say that
Fred’s Twain-beliefs involve one way of thinking of Twain and that his Clemens-
beliefs involve a different way of thinking of Twain. But why does that allow us
to explain why Fred is in no position at t1 to infer that his eccentric neighbor had
died? One might think the answer obvious. The inferences we are considering are,
roughly, of the forms:
(1) F(t); c = the N; therefore, F(the N)
(2) F(c); c = the N; therefore, F(the N)
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But the question, quite simply, is why (2) is the correct formalization only when
the two beliefs involve the same way of thinking of Twain, (1) being the correct
formalization if the two beliefs involve different ways of thinking of Twain. And
the answer, I take it, is that, for Frege, this is simply one of the roles the notion
of sense was supposed to play: For Frege, that is to say, sameness of sense is the
standard by which we judge whether an argument equivocates. Or, to put the point
in a way reminiscent of an earlier discussion (see section 2.3), sameness of sense is
what is required if the premises and conclusion of an inference are to be related in
the way they need to be for that inference to be permissible (Taschek, 1992; May,
2006; Heck and May, 2010).
It is important to see that only identity and difference of sense play a role in the
Fregean story: The particular senses Fred associates with ‘Twain’ and ‘Clemens’
play no role at all. If this is not already obvious, consider this point: The senses
Fred associates with ‘Twain’ and ‘Clemens’ could be swapped, and nothing in the
foregoing would need to be changed; that is because the senses Fred associates
with these expressions have not been identified except by using such descriptions
as ‘the sense Fred associates with “Twain”’. We don’t know well enough how to
talk about sense to do any better than that. So the main work the notion of sense
is doing here is that it licenses us to treat Fred’s beliefs that Twain has died and
that Clemens has died as standing in different inferential relations with other of his
beliefs.
Frege’s own account of Frege cases thus has two parts. First, Frege claims that,
because Fred thinks of Clemens under two different modes of presentation, he has
two sets of beliefs about him that stand in different inferential relations with his
other beliefs. For example, there are at least some inferential relations in which
Fred’s belief that Clemens is his neighbor stands to his belief that Clemens has
died in which it does not stand to his belief that Twain has died. Second, Frege
uses the fact that these beliefs stand in different inferential relations to explain the
problematic aspects of Fred’s psychology. The important point is that the notion of
sense figures only in the first part of this explanation: Frege uses the fact that the
beliefs have different contents to explain why Fred’s belief that Clemens has died
is related to his belief that Clemens is his neighbor in the way required for Fred to
be able reasonably to infer that his neighbor has died. If we could offer a different
explanation of why Fred’s beliefs stand in the inferential relations they do, then, we
would not need the notion of sense to solve Frege’s puzzle. This fact, note, simply
follows from the structure of Frege’s own solution.
The thing to say here is not that Fred’s belief that Twain has died is ‘infer-
entially isolated’ from his belief that Clemens is his neighbor. Fred is presumably
quite capable of engaging in reasoning in which both beliefs play a role: For exam-
ple, if Fred also believes, for whatever reason, that Clemens admired Twain, then
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he might conclude that someone his neighbor admired has died. What we need to
explain, rather, is why Fred is not prepared to infer from the premises that Twain
has died and that Clemens is his neighbor to the conclusion that his neighbor has
died, and why it would not be rational for him to do so, if he did. Similarly, we
need to explain why Fred does not (and rationally need not) regard the belief that
Twain has died as incompatible with the belief that Clemens has not died, though
he does (and should) regard it as incompatible with the belief that Twain has not
died, so that he can rationally believe both that Twain has died and that Clemens
has not died but cannot rationally believe both that Twain has died and that Twain
has not died.
As I have said, the notion of sense is designed by Frege precisely to play this
role. It plays this role by both distinguishing and relating the contents of Fred’s
beliefs: It distinguishes the contents of his beliefs that Clemens has died and that
Twain has died, and it relates the contents of his beliefs that Clemens has died
and that Clemens is his neighbor. So what the naïve theorist needs is a way to
distinguish and relate these beliefs without distinguishing their contents.
There is a familiar way to do this: Treat beliefs as having logical forms in
something like the way sentences and formulae do; then explain how beliefs in-
teract inferentially in terms of their having the logical forms they do. Indeed, one
of the central motivations for the language of thought hypothesis is that inferen-
tial relations between mental states are most naturally explained on the assump-
tion that mental states have syntactic properties: Logical relations among mental
states become formal relations, and inference becomes computation (Fodor, 1975).
The obvious way to implement the proposal we are discussing is thus to identify
the logical form of a belief with the syntactic structure of the Mentalese sentence
that expresses it. Belief could then be regarded as a relation between a subject,
a proposition, and a sentence of Mentalese, and so we would have arrived at a
representationalist form of the ternary view of belief.
In a sense, I am going to endorse this view: I am, that is to say, inclined to
accept the language of thought hypothesis. But, on its own, I do not think that the
view just outlined yields a solution to Frege’s puzzle nor, as we shall see, that it
can even play a significant role in the solution to Frege’s puzzle. The problem is
that explaining the cognitive changes that occur in Fred in terms of what sentences
of Mentalese appear in his belief box seems to be incompatible with the thesis that
psychological laws subsume psychological states in virtue of the intentional prop-
erties of those states. This is precisely the point, in fact, that drives Fodor to bite
the bullet and deny that our behavior in Frege cases admits of any psychological
explanation at all (Fodor, 1994, lecture 1).47
47 My understanding of Frege cases is thus very close to Fodor’s. But my characterization of
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Suppose we were to explain Fred’s coming to believe that his neighbor had
died like this:
Fred had a belief b1 with the content that Clemens had died, that be-
lief being expressed by the Mentalese sentence ‘D(c)’; Fred also had
a belief b2 with the content that Clemens was his neighbor, that belief
being expressed by the Mentalese sentence ‘c = the N’; he then in-
ferred the sentence ‘D(the N)’, which in turn expressed his new belief
that his neighbor had died.
If that is the right story, then, I submit, non-intentional properties of psycholog-
ical states do indeed play an indispensable role in the explanation: The expla-
nation makes explicit reference to particular Mentalese sentences, such as D(c),
and therefore lacks anything like the generality psychological laws formulated in
terms of content were supposed to have. One can see this by considering what
the corresponding psychological law would be: It too would make explicit refer-
ence to particular Mentalese sentences, and, as a matter of empirical fact, it would
therefore probably have no other instances than Fred and so would lack the sort
of generality we ordinarily suppose psychological laws to have. If everyone had
the same language of thought—if the same sentence expressed the same content in
my language of thought that it did in everyone else’s—then that would be differ-
ent, but we have no reason to suppose that is true.48 Indeed, there is no obvious
reason to suppose that the notion of ‘same Mentalese sentence’ so much as makes
sense inter-personally. It is for largely this reason that, even if one does accept
the language of thought hypothesis, psychological laws must still be stated at the
level of content. The computational story in which Mentalese appears is supposed
to be a story about how psychological states and processes are implemented. It
follows that explicit reference to sentences of Mentalese should no more appear in
psychological laws than does explicit reference to neurons.
We do not, however, have to make explicit reference to Mentalese sentences to
explain why Fred came to believe that his neighbor had died. It is easy to see, first
of all, that which Mentalese sentences express the beliefs in question is completely
irrelevant to the explanation on offer. To make this explicit, we might quantify over
such sentences, thus:
the problem does not depend, as Fodor’s does, upon questions about how psychological states are
implemented. That is, it does not depend upon the representational theory of the mind. The problem,
as I see it, is more general.
48 We have no reason to suppose, in fact, that there are any non-semantic properties shared by
different people’s representations of the same content. This is a persistent theme in Murat Aydede’s
writings on this topic (see Aydede, 2000a,b; Aydede and Robbins, 2001) and, in fact, is a point Fodor
makes himself (Fodor, 1982, pp. 101–2).
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Fred had a belief b1 with the content that Clemens had died, that belief
being expressed by a Mentalese sentence of the form ‘D(c)’; Fred also
had a belief b2 with the content that Clemens was his neighbor, that be-
lief being expressed by a Mentalese sentence of the form ‘c = the N’,
where the use of the same term c here as previously signals that these
beliefs share an element of their form; Fred then inferred the corre-
sponding sentence of the form ‘D(the N)’, which in turn expresses his
new belief that his neighbor has died.
This is a significant improvement: Even if everyone has his own language of
thought, that will not prevent the corresponding psychological law from having
plenty of instances. But we can go even further. How psychological states are
implemented—for example, the fact, if it is one, that beliefs are computational re-
lations to syntactically articulated mental representations—ought to be irrelevant
to the explanation being given. What is relevant is the fact that Fred’s beliefs stand
in certain relations and not in others. How exactly a statement of these relations
should enter psychological explanation is not a question I am now in any position
to answer, but one option would be to say something like the following:
Fred had a belief b1 with the content < Clemens, having died >; Fred
also had a belief b2 with the content < Clemens, =, his neighbor >;
these beliefs were ‘formally related’ via their respective first terms.
Since these beliefs were ‘formally related’ in this way, Fred was then
able to infer the belief with the content < his neighbor, having died >,
where this belief is ‘formally related’ to b1 via their second terms and
to b2 via their the first and last terms, respectively.
That Fred was in no position at t1 to infer that his neighbor had died would then be
explained as follows:
At t1, Fred had a belief b0 with the content < Clemens, having died >;
he also had a belief b2 with the content < Clemens, =, his neighbor >.
But these beliefs were not ‘formally related’ in any way and so Fred
was in no position to infer any belief with the content < his neighbor,
having died >.
The pattern is clear enough for present purposes.49
49 A suggestion very close to this one has been developed by Taschek (1995; 1998) in connection
with questions about belief-attribution. Our concern, of course, is with belief rather than belief-
attribution, but reflection on Taschek’s position was nonetheless important to the emergence of the
view I am developing here. See, in particular, the discussion on p. 330 of “On Ascribing Beliefs”
(Taschek, 1998), and see note 56 for some further remarks.
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The term ‘formally related’ is a term of art. What it is supposed to mean is
familiar from formal logic: Saying that Fred’s belief that Clemens has died is ‘for-
mally related’ to his belief that Clemens is his neighbor means that the beliefs have
the feature we aim to capture in formal logic when we represent them this way:
D(c), c = the N; rather than this way: D(t), c = the N. To put the point more
intuitively, it means that an inference from these two beliefs that relied upon the
identity of the subject of the first and the subject of the second would not depend
for its correctness upon an additional premise asserting their identity: It would not
equivocate, and it would not be enthymematic.
There can be no doubt that there are such inferences: inferences that presume
rather than state the identity of objects mentioned at different points. If the infer-
ence
Clemens has died
Clemens is my neighbor
So, my neighbor has died
were necessarily enthymematic, relying upon the unstated premise ‘Clemens is
Clemens’, then the inference
Clemens has died
Clemens is my neighbor
Clemens is Clemens
So, my neighbor has died
would also be enthymematic, and the regress would have begun. (Perhaps the
tortoise ought to have mentioned that to Achilles.) So there must be some such
relation as the one I am calling ‘formal’. What its nature is, is a question to which
we shall return.
It is important to note that the presence or absence of these formal relations
is no guarantee that a given argument will be valid: It is typically a necessary
condition on the validity of an inference that its premises and conclusion should be
formally related in a certain way; it is almost never a sufficient one. Indeed, the
existence of such formal relations is every bit as important to our understanding of
fallacious inferences as it is to our understanding of valid ones.50 The following
argument, for example, is fallacious:
(3) If Clemens has died, then Martha is upset.
Martha is upset.
So, Clemens has died.
50 Thanks to Ernie Lepore for asking a question that prompted these thoughts.
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But this argument is just incoherent:
(4) If Twain has died, then Martha is upset.
Martha is upset.
So, Clemens has died.
While it may not rational to believe the conclusion of (3) just because one be-
lieves its premises, one can nonetheless understand the mistake. But only seriously
confused people would ‘reason’ as in (4). Yet the only difference between these
arguments is that the first premise of (3) is formally related to its conclusion in a
way that the first premise of (4) is not formally related to its conclusion.
We can now see what Frege’s puzzle is actually about. It is widely appreciated
nowadays that it doesn’t really have anything to do with identity-statements. (That
would be why identity-statements have hardly been mentioned to this point.) Frege
himself does often use examples involving identity-statements when he introduces
the puzzle, but he also uses other sorts of examples, such as the pair:51
Hesperus is a planet.
Phosphorous is a planet.
The usual understanding of the puzzle nowadays is thus that it somehow concerns
substitution. But what our discussion reveals is that the puzzle really concerns
something even more fundamental, namely: when thoughts (or sentences) are so
related that a transition from some of them to another counts as rational even if
fallacious; that is, the puzzle concerns what distinguishes a case like (3) from a
case like (4). And if that is what the puzzle is about, then we can also understand
why the puzzle was of such interest to Frege: It sits at the very foundation of logic.
As we saw, for Frege, the sorts of ‘formal’ relationships between mental states
that we have been discussing are to be characterized in terms of sense. Suppose, for
example, that Fred believes that Martha is upset and that, if Clemens has died, then
Martha is upset, and that he concludes, as in (3), that Clemens has died. According
to Frege, this inference is fallacious rather than incoherent because the thought
that is the content of Fred’s belief that Clemens has died is itself a constituent
of—it is the antecedent of—the thought that is the content of his belief that, if
Clemens has died, then Martha is upset. What I am calling the ‘formal relationship’
between the mental states therefore supervenes, for Frege, on an internal relation
between the contents of those states. And that, indeed, is what is distinctive of
Frege’s view: Everything that is necessary for the evaluation of the correctness of
an inference is present already in the contents of the mental states that are involved
51 I have discussed Frege’s own treatment of the puzzle elsewhere (Heck, 2003; Heck and May,
2006, 2010).
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in that inference. For Frege, then, validity is in the first instance a relation between
contents.52
The proposal I am making abandons this aspect of Frege’s view. It implies
that the correctness of an inference—a rational transition from one mental state
to another—cannot be stated purely in terms of facts about the contents of the
states involved. The formal relations that hold between mental states must also be
specified, and the fact that certain beliefs do or do not stand in such formal relations
does not supervene on those beliefs’ contents. That, I am claiming, is what Frege
cases show us. And for the very same reason, the proposal I am making implies that
psychological explanations and laws cannot be stated purely in terms of facts about
the contents of mental states, either. But, to emphasize, the alternative I am offering
is not that we should also make reference to particular Mentalese sentences—that
would be fatal—nor even that we should make some less direct use of the fact,
if it is one, that beliefs are computational relations to Mentalese sentences. How
psychological states and processes are implemented is, on my view, neither here
nor there so far as psychological explanations and laws are concerned. What is
important is whether particular beliefs stand in the sorts of relations I am calling
‘formal’ relations, and the foregoing is intended as a proof that there are such
relations.
In the end, then, we do not need to be able to assign logical forms to beliefs to
explain how people behave in Frege cases. We do not, that is to say, need to ascribe
a particular logical form to Fred’s belief that Clemens has died and a particular
form to his belief that Clemens is his neighbor and then determine, by examining
these forms, whether the two beliefs stand in an appropriate formal relation. It may
well be that two beliefs’ standing in such a relation is, as a matter of fact, ultimately
to be explained in terms of facts about how cognitive states are implemented. But
psychological explanation need advert only to the fact that the beliefs do or do not
stand in certain formal relations.
So I am not denying the language of thought hypothesis. I am claiming, rather,
that it is not needed for the solution of Frege’s puzzle. As far as the resolution
of Frege cases is concerned—and, perhaps, so far as intentional explanation and
intentional laws, generally, are concerned—the sorts of formal relations among be-
liefs that must be mentioned may be treated as psychologically primitive: We can
make reference directly to these relations in giving intentional explanations and in
stating intentional laws.53 Whether formal relations among beliefs are metaphysi-
cally primitive is a different question, and surely they are not. And of course there
52 It may be worth emphasizing that one’s views about the relation between inference and validity
are irrelevant to the issues under discussion here. But it will become important later that we not run
these together.
53 Taschek (1998, p. 332) makes much the same point in connection with attribution.
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are alternatives to the language of thought hypothesis. One might endorse a sort of
inferentialism: The belief-states in which Fred might find himself constitute a kind
of inferential network, and the place a particular state occupies in such a network
is a purely extrinsic feature of that state, which might as well be regarded as hav-
ing no internal structure whatsoever;54 formal relatedness will then be a feature of
the inferential network. But the metaphysics of formal relatedness is not at issue
here. Indeed, the point is precisely that solving Frege’s puzzle does not require us
to resolve that issue. Since I myself lean strongly towards the language of thought
hypothesis, however, I shall occasionally help myself to it, since doing so often
simplifies the exposition.
3.4 Summary
Here, in short summary, is the dialectical progression to this point, as I understand
it.
The Fregean: Frege cases show that Fred’s believing that Clemens has died
and his believing that Twain has died are distinct mental states. So they must have
different contents.
The Naïve Theorist: I agree that they are different states. But why must they
have different contents?
The Fregean: These states play different causal and explanatory roles, and psy-
chological explanation is intentional explanation; psychological laws are inten-
tional laws; and mental causation, if it is to be worth saving, must be causation in
virtue of intentional features. That’s why they must have different contents.
The Naïve Theorist: That isn’t so much an argument as a challenge. And I think
I can explain how the beliefs that Clemens has died and that Twain has died could
play different roles in Fred’s cognition without having different contents. They
do so in virtue of their being differently connected, inferentially speaking, with
other of Fred’s mental states. Thus, the belief that Clemens has died—a certain to-
ken mental state with the content < Clemens, having died >—can get together with
Fred’s belief that Clemens is his neighbor to cause a new belief that Fred’s neigh-
bor has died. His belief that Twain has died—which is a certain other token mental
state with the same content—cannot get together with his belief that Clemens is his
neighbor to cause a new belief that his neighbor has died. The difference is thus
real enough. But it is due to the fact that different beliefs with the same content can
stand in different ‘formal relations’ with other beliefs, not to the alleged fact that
these beliefs have different contents.
54 This issue has a long history in Frege scholarship where it appears in the form: Are thoughts
complexes composed of senses (Heck and May, 2010)? As far as the substantive issue is concerned,
this view is common among inferentialists, such as Robert Brandom (1994).
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The Fregean: These ‘formal relations’, as you call them, cannot simply be
brute: There must be some story to be told about when they hold and when they
do not. I have such a story to tell: The inferential relations that hold between
mental states are determined by the contents of those states, in particular, by the
senses that appear in those contents. Quite obviously, you are barred from any
such account: According to you, the inferential relations in which beliefs stand
cannot supervene on content. But then it appears that something non-intentional
must enter psychological explanation, for what grounds the formal relations are
non-intentional facts.
The Naïve Theorist: I agree that it would be strange to regard the ‘formal rela-
tions’ as brute. So their obtaining or failing to obtain must supervene on something
else. But it is no part of my view here to say what that is. It might be a lot of things.
For what it’s worth, I suspect that the language of thought hypothesis is true and
that formal relations supervene on Mentalese syntax. But it just doesn’t follow
from the fact that formal relations are constituted by syntactic facts about Men-
talese that there is no difference between appealing to formal relations between
beliefs and appealing to syntactic facts about Mentalese. The most obvious differ-
ence is that explanations and laws formulated in the latter terms sacrifice generality
in a way that explanations and laws formulated in the former terms do not. Ulti-
mately, the point is really quite a familiar one: We’re dealing with different levels of
explanation. Psychological explanation appeals to formal relations between men-
tal states, relations that are implemented by syntactic facts about Mentalese. And
just as psychological explanation is distinct from neurological explanation, so it is
distinct from any explanation that would appeal to syntactic facts about Mentalese.
The Fregean: Frankly, I don’t find that very satisfying. It seems to me as if there
is some sense in which syntax is what’s really doing the work on your view—some
sense in which Fred’s behavior isn’t really being explained in terms of what he
believes, in terms of content.
The Naïve Theorist: Well, frankly, I don’t always find the view satisfying my-
self. So why don’t you see if you can’t get at what’s bothering you some other
way?
4 Objections and Replies
4.1 Attribution and Communication
Objection There is a strong intuition that:
(5) If Fred believes that Clemens has died and also believes that Clemens is
his neighbor, then, ceteris paribus, he will be in a position to infer that his
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neighbor has died.
But according to you, there is no such law.
Reply That depends. I certainly do deny this:
(6) If Fred has a belief with the content < Clemens, having died > and another
with the content < Clemens, =, his neighbor >, then, ceteris paribus, he will
be in a position to infer a belief with the content < his neighbor, having
died >.
In my view, and contrary to the view of Fodor’s we discussed in section 1, Frege
cases show that there is no such law. But there is no immediate conflict between the
intuition expressed by (5) and my denial of (6), as even a momentary glance at the
two statements shows. To get a conflict, you have to assume that I am committed
to the view that (5) entails (6). Indeed, what underlies the objection is presumably
the thought that, on my view, (5) and (6) must express the same thing, because,
on my view, “N believes that S” is true if, and only if, N has a belief whose con-
tent is the Russellian proposition that is expressed by the sentence S. That is: The
objector is supposing that I am committed to a naïve Russellian treatment of belief-
attributions.55 But I have repeatedly insisted that the views about belief that I am
defending here are wholly independent of any view about the semantics of belief-
attributions. And, as it happens, I reject the naïve Russellian account for the simple
reason that I think, as most people do, that “Fred believes that Clemens had died”
may be false even if “Fred believes that Twain has died” is true. I think, more-
over, that some utterances of “Fred believes that Clemens has died and also that
Clemens is his eccentric neighbor” will be true only if the beliefs mentioned are
formally related in the way indicated by the language used in ascribing them. It
will be no surprise that I have no semantics for belief-attribution—or, better, for
complement clauses—that will deliver this conclusion.56 My point is simply that,
if belief-attribution does work this way, then we need not deny the intuition the
55 Part of the point here is that, in so far as (5) expresses something about which one can have
intuitions that have some claim to be respected, (5) itself must be a statement that is expressed in
ordinary language.
56 There are several accounts in the literature that are broadly consistent with the view towards
which I am gesturing. Taschek’s account, mentioned earlier (in note 49), is very much in this spirit,
and interpreted logical form accounts share something of the underlying idea, too (Larson and Lud-
low, 1993); so too do views that rely upon co-indexing (Fiengo and May, 1994).
As I have referred to Taschek’s view a few times now, let me say a few words about it. The
proposal is that we should “reject the idea that semantic content is subject to unrestricted composi-
tionality and accept instead a principle that requires. . . the preservation of global logical structure”
(Taschek, 1998, p. 331), where sentences like (i) “Clemens has died” and (i′) “Twain has died” have
different ‘global’ logical structures though they have the same ‘local’ logical structure. So, if same-
ness of content is guaranteed only if substitution preserves global logical structure, then (ii) “Fred
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objector is expressing. It will be perfectly consistent with the view being defended
here.
Objection When the grocer tells Fred “Sam Clemens has died”, Fred forms
a new belief, the one you have been describing as the belief that Sam Clemens has
died.57 But, according to you, this is a belief that has the same content as the belief
that Mark Twain has died, and that is a belief Fred already had. Why does Fred
form a new belief with the same content rather than simply regarding himself as
having acquired additional evidence for the belief he already held?
More simply, consider t1, when Fred was reading the paper and saw the obitu-
ary for “Mark Twain”. Why did he form the belief that Mark Twain had died rather
than the belief that Sam Clemens had died, if these beliefs have the same content?
Reply Exactly how this objection should be answered depends upon how
we should understand the use of language in communication. But there is at least
one view that permits an answer.
Suppose that one’s occurrent understanding of an uttered sentence consists in
one’s knowing a T-sentence for it, one delivered by the operation of the language
faculty (Heck, 2005, 2007b). Thus, to understand the sentence “snow is white” as
uttered by a normal speaker of English is to know that the utterance in question is
true if, and only if, snow is white. Then, just as the belief that Twain has died is
different from the belief that Clemens has died, so the belief that
(SC) “Sam Clemens has died” is true if, and only if, Sam Clemens has
died
is different from the belief that
(MT) “Sam Clemens has died” is true if, and only if, Mark Twain has
died.
believes that Clemens has died” and (ii′) “Fred believes that Twain has died” are not guaranteed
to have the same content and so may have different truth-values. But the form of compositionality
Taschek endorses (what he calls GLS-compositionality) implies that even the simple sentences (i)
and (i′) need not have the same meaning even if ‘Clemens’ and ‘Twain’ do, and it implies this for
the very same reason it implies that (ii) and (ii′) need not have the same meaning. I should em-
phasize that GLS-compositionality does not actually tells us that the sentences in these pairs do not
have different contents, only that they need not, so it is consistent with Taschek’s view that only
the sentences in the second pair have different meanings. But the real problem is that we lack any
account of how, consistently with GLS-compositionality, the meaning of a complex expression is
determined by the meanings of its parts. To put it differently: It is one thing to state a restricted form
of compositionality; it is another to produce a semantic theory consistent with it.
57 Note that, if the remarks in the previous reply are correct, this language may be perfectly in
order and so not be used simply ‘for lack of better language’, as I said above.
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When the grocer utters the sentence “Sam Clemens has died”, Fred’s linguistic
competence issues in the occurrent belief (SC). Fred takes himself to have reasons
to regard the grocer as speaking the literal truth, so he discharges the left-hand side
and forms the belief that Clemens has died. Had his linguistic competence instead
issued in the belief (MT), the parallel inference would have yielded that Twain had
died, and in that case Fred would merely have acquried additional evidence for a
belief he already held.
It should be obvious that a similar story can be told about why Fred formed the
belief that Twain had died when he read in the paper “Mark Twain has died” rather
than forming the belief that Clemens had died.
It is worth noting that, while these remarks obviously do not commit me to
the distinction between sense and reference, they do something remarkably simi-
lar. According to this view, Fred understands the expressions ‘Mark Twain’ and
‘Samuel Clemens’ differently, and this difference makes its presence felt even in
the most literal communication. The difference lies in the fact that Fred knows that
‘Mark Twain’ refers to Mark Twain but not that it refers to Sam Clemens (compare
Heck, 1995; McDowell, 1998). And if one thinks, as I do, that semantic theory
should be in the business of expounding the knowledge of meaning that constitutes
a speaker’s semantic competence,58 then we may also say that there is a semantic
difference between these two names: What a correct semantic theory for Fred’s
idiolect would report about the one name is different from what it would report
about the other. In that sense, they mean different things to Fred.59
4.2 Psychological Explanation
Objection The proposal you are defending is that psychological explanation
should make reference both to the contents of psychological states and to the in-
ferential relations in which such states stand to one another. But surely this is
an old idea. According to so-called two-factor theories, such as that defended by
Ned Block (1986), there are two aspects to the content of a mental state: Its wide
content, which we may identify with the Russellian proposition you are calling its
content simpliciter, and its narrow content, which is the state’s conceptual role. So
it looks very much as if Block has precisely the resources you are deploying. What,
then, is different about your view?60
58 The prime mover in this tradition is James Higginbotham (1985; 1989; 1992). Other defenders
of the view include Richard Larson and Gabriel Segal (1995, ch. 1).
59 But surely, one might object, there is no objective sense in which these words have different
meanings! True, but why suppose that ‘meaning’, in this ‘objective’ sense, has any role to play in
the semantics of natural language?
60 A similar worry is voiced by Akeel Bilgrami (1998), and the reply is much the same. Bilgrami
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Reply The similarities between my view and Block’s are illusory.
First, and most importantly, the sorts of formal relations to which I am claiming
appeal must be made in psychological explanation are very different from the sorts
of inferential relations on which conceptual role theorists have focused. The latter
would include, for example, the inference from “It’s a cat” to “It’s an animal”, and,
as Block makes clear, it must include a fair bit besides if we’re not to get the same
narrow content for ‘cat’ that we get for ‘dog’ (Block, 1986, pp. 628ff). The formal
relations to which the naïve theorist must appeal to handle Frege cases, on the
other hand, are, well, formal relations that serve merely to distinguish beliefs Fred
regards as, of their very essence, concerning the same object from beliefs he either
does not regard as being about the same object at all or regards as being about the
same object only because of collateral information he possesses. For this reason,
Fred’s Twain-beliefs and his Orwell-beliefs will stand in precisely the same sorts
of formal relations to other beliefs, even though they will stand in these relations to
different beliefs—his Twain-beliefs to other Twain-beliefs, and his Orwell-beliefs
to other Orwell-beliefs. Similarly, his cat-beliefs and his dog-beliefs will stand in
the same formal relations to other beliefs, though they will stand in these relations
to different beliefs: the cat-beliefs to other cat-beliefs; the dog-beliefs to other
dog-beliefs.
Second, and relatedly, although one sometimes encounters language that sug-
gests otherwise, two-factor theorists do not identify narrow content with conceptual
role. The conceptual role of a state is supposed to determine its narrow content.
This is not an optional feature of such views. On two-factor views, psychological
laws are at least as involved, and are usually much more involved, with narrow
content than they are with wide content: It is in virtue of the fact that two agents
have beliefs with the same narrow contents that they will instantiate the same psy-
chological laws. So, if psychological explanation is to be intentional explanation,
sharing narrow content must be sharing intentional properties. But it simply isn’t
obvious why sharing conceptual roles is sharing any sort of intentional—that is,
representational—property. One therefore has to earn the right to this claim by
explaining how conceptual role determines some intentional property we can iden-
tify with narrow content. That is why Block is so concerned to argue—though the
details of his particular view are surely optional—that narrow content is a function
argues that syntactic facts concerning Mentalese depend upon what kinds of inferences get made.
Some of his arguments seem to have more to do with how we might decide such questions rather
than with what constitutes such facts. But even if we waive this point and suppose that syntactic
facts are constituted by facts about what inferences get made, the kinds of inference that individuate
syntax will be the broadly ‘formal’ inferences on which I’ve been focused, rather than the kinds of
inferences that distinguish dog-beliefs from cat-beliefs.
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from context to wide contents (Block, 1986, pp. 643ff).61 It is also why Block
identifies it as “the crucial question” for two-factor views “what counts as identity
and difference of conceptual role” (Block, 1986, pp. 629). I hope it is obvious that
no such questions arise for the view I am defending.
Objection The examples on which you have been focused largely concern
the explanation of changes of mind—cognitive or affective—rather than the ex-
planation of behavior. That, perhaps, is why the examples have featured proper
names rather than demonstratives or indexicals. So consider the following sort of
example. Fred is absolutely terrifed of aircraft carriers but now has the bad luck
to find himself in a Perry-inspired philosophy example. So there he is looking out
one window when he sees the stern of a ship, one he does not identify as an aircraft
carrier, and then he turns and looks out another window, sees the bow of a ship,
immediately does identify it as an aircraft carrier, and proceeds to jump out the first
window, thus running away from where he takes the aircraft carrier to be. Please
explain Fred’s behavior.
Reply What this sort of example shows is that we need to extend our con-
ception of the formal relations in which a belief might stand to involve relations
to perceptual states. Demonstrative thoughts, I take it, are thoughts that are con-
nected in some special way to perceptual representations (Evans, 1982, ch. 5).
If one thinks that perceptual representations are fully conceptualized and so that
the very same concepts that occur in thought can also occur in perception, then
there is no problem whatsoever: The perceptual representation of the ship as seen
through the second window simply involves the very same ‘demonstrative con-
cept’ that is deployed in Fred’s belief that thatbow ship is an aircraft carrier, and the
story told about Twain and Clemens applies almost without change. More impor-
tantly, one can tell much the same story even if one thinks, as I do (Heck, 2000,
2007a), that perceptual representations are not fully conceptualized, so long as
they are conceptualized in the relevant respect, that is, so long as there are object-
representations of some sort in perception (Siegel, 2006). The perceptual repre-
sentation and the demonstrative thought could then be formally connected via the
object-representation contained in the former and the demonstrative concept con-
tained in the latter.
Even if perceptual representation is wholly unconceptualized, however, it is
surely a constraint on any decent view that some sense be made of the idea that
there are certain sorts of thoughts—demonstrative thoughts—that one can have
only because, and only in so far as, one is (or at least appears to be) in percep-
tual contact with an object.62 The fact that Fred forms the belief he does—that
61 A similar point could be made, obviously, about any form of two-dimensionalism.
62 Note that this is a claim about certain thoughts, that is, about certain token mental states, not a
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thatbow ship is an aircraft carrier rather than the belief that thatstern ship is an
aircraft carrier—is therefore to be explained in terms of the fact that the percep-
tual representation he has of the ship as seen through the second window is ‘for-
mally’ connected—that’s probably not the right notion, but it will have to do—with
thatbow-beliefs rather than with thatstern-beliefs, and so on and so forth. The story
one would need to tell would then be far more complex than the one about Twain
and Clemens, but it would follow broadly similar lines. The fact that Fred, having
come to believe that thatbow ship is an aircraft carrier, jumps out the first window,
whereas he would have jumped out the second had he come to believe that thatstern
ship was an aircraft carrier, is to be explained in much the same way.
One might well say, then, that demonstrative thoughts, as a class, have a dis-
tinguishing feature, one thoughts in general do not have: Demonstrative thoughts,
as I have been saying, are connected to perception (and maybe also to action) in
a special way. And perhaps there are useful generalizations to be stated about the
members of this class. If so, then, demonstrative thoughts, as a class, form a psy-
chological kind. But it is no part of my view, and I see no reason why it should
be part of anyone’s view, that all psychological kinds must have their boundaries
fixed by content.
Objection You didn’t say anything about indexicals. What, then, about
self-conscious, first-person beliefs? More generally, what about so-called self-
locating beliefs?
Reply Frankly, I’d like to declare myself out of space, because I don’t really
know what to say about indexicals. It seems clear that thoughts about myself,
about here, and about now play a fundamental role in human cognition, and some
account needs to be given of that fact. Moreover, it seems obvious that there are
psychological laws about such thoughts: The effects my self-conscious thoughts
have on my behavior are similar to the effects your self-conscious thoughts have
on your behavior.
Now, as I just said, I see no reason that there should not be psychological
kinds whose instances are unified by something other than a shared aspect of their
content. So perhaps the thing to say is that self-conscious thoughts, and indexical
thoughts more generally, are another example of such a kind. Even if that is so,
however, something still needs to be said about what unifies this kind if it is not
an aspect of content. It’d be nice if indexical thoughts could be fit into the mold
of demonstrative thoughts: Perhaps the similarities between your self-conscious
claim about the contents of those thoughts. The claim is not that there are contents one can entertain
only if one is in perceptual content with a particular object, but rather that there are certain cognitive
states one can only then be in. There is therefore no commitment here to any sort of conceptual role
semantics or, as Fodor has been calling it, ‘conceptual pragmatism’.
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thoughts and mine could be explained in terms of similar connections between
those thoughts and certain sorts of perceptual, kinaesthetic, etc., states in which
we might find ourselves. I’m in no position to say. I’m also in no position to say
whether, if we had such an account, we would find ourselves tempted by the claim
that the content of Twain’s self-conscious thought that he is an author differs from
that of his thought that Twain is an author. But even if the question were decided
Frege’s way, that would be but a small victory for him, since there is no prospect,
so far as I can see, of parlaying that victory into a larger one.
Note, however, that this issue does not really have anything to do with Frege
cases, and my claim here has been simply that Frege cases, by themselves, do not
motivate a distinction between sense and reference. Indexicality has much more to
do with Twin cases, about which a little more shortly.
Objection You argued earlier that your view is consistent with the thesis
that psychological explanation is intentional explanation. The reason was supposed
to be that the only reference to non-intentional features of mental states that is re-
quired in psychological explanation is reference to formal relations between states.
But there is another worry, namely, that intentional content, on your view, plays
no significant role at all. Consider Fred’s buddy Barney. At t0, Barney has heard
nothing about anyone dying. Now suppose that at t1 Barney comes to have a belief
with the content: < Twain, having died >. The belief in question might be the one
you have been describing as the belief that Twain has died; or it might be the belief
that Clemens has died; or it might be based upon a demonstrative presentation of
Twain. The supposition that Barney has a belief with the content < Twain, hav-
ing died > does not decide among the many different beliefs with that content he
might have. But then it seems as if the hypothesis that Barney has acquired a belief
with that content has no determinate consequences whatsoever, and that strongly
suggests that the contents of mental states are not, on your view, doing any real
work.
Reply I fully appreciate this kind of worry. Indeed, when I first started
working on this paper, I believed that considerations of this kind would ultimately
serve to reveal why we do need some notion of sense. And, to be honest, I would
not be shocked if, in the end, Frege won this battle on precisely this ground. But it
now seems to me that this objection can be answered.
We need to distinguish two questions. One is the very general question what
role, if any, content plays in psychological explanation or, relatedly, to what extent
the semantic properties of mental states are causally efficacious. Some people
have of course held that content is causually epiphenomenal (e.g., Segal and Sober,
1991). Some have even held that the representational theory of the mind has no
need for any notion of content, since all psychological explanation can proceed
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directly in terms of syntax (e.g., Stich, 1983). I doubt it, but I do not claim to know
precisely what to say here. These are very hard problems.
Fortunately, however, they are not our problems. The relevant question here
is whether giving the sort of explanation I have proposed we should give in Frege
cases somehow undermines the view that content has some substantial role to play
in explanation, mental causation, or what have you. And to that question, it seems
to me, the answer is clearly “No”. I am most certainly not proposing that Fred’s
changes of mind can be explained wholly in terms of the syntax of his mental states.
On the contrary, although I am proposing that Fred’s changes of mind should be
explained, in part, in terms of formal relations between his mental states, the expla-
nations as I stated them also make explicit reference to the contents of those states.
Perhaps the reference to content is merely apparent; perhaps it can be explained
away. But that is a different question, and nothing I have said here makes it any
more or less likely that it can be.
Objection That may be, but it doesn’t address the underlying worry. Ac-
cording to you, Barney’s beliefs that Clemens had died, that Twain has died, and
that that guy has died all have the same content. But then any psychological law
that applied to one of them would also have to apply to the others, and that is
absurd.63
Reply If I may first stop to pick a nit: It is not true that my view implies that
any psychological law that subsumes one state with the content < Twain, having
died > will also subsume all other such states. I suggested, in response to a previous
objection, that demonstrative thoughts might form a psychological kind. If so, there
might be laws that subsumed demonstrative thoughts with this content that did not
subsume all such thoughts.
But, of course, the worry remains: Any law that subsumes Barney’s belief that
Clemens has died in virtue of its content also subsumes his belief that Twain has
died. This is correct, but, so far as I can see, it is not a bug but a feature. One such
law might be this one:
If one has a belief with the content < Twain, having died > and one
also has a belief with the content < Twain, =, Fred’s neighbor >, where
these two beliefs are formally related via their first components, then
one will, ceteris paribus, be in a position to acquire a new belief with
the content < Fred’s neighbor, having died >, where this belief is for-
mally related to the first via their first components and to the second
via their first and third components, respectively.
This is the kind of law that I am proposing is at work in Frege cases, and it both
63 Jacob Beck (2008) expresses a version of this worry.
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does and should subsume both Barney’s Twain-beliefs and his Clemens-beliefs.
Nothing untoward follows: Suppose Barney has the belief that Clemens is Fred’s
eccentric neighbor but not the belief that Twain is. Then he will not instantiate the
law if he acquires the belief that Twain has died but will if he acquires the belief
that Clemens has died. If he did have the belief that Twain was Fred’s eccentric
neighbor, the law mentioned would predict that, ceteris paribus, Barney would be
in a position to acquire the belief that Fred’s neighbor has died if he acquired the
belief that Twain had died. And all of that is correct.
So yes, the mere fact that Barney has a belief with the content < Twain, having
died > tells us very little about how he is likely to behave, think, or feel. But that is
no surprise. No single belief in isolation has any particular connection to behavior.
How Barney is likely to behave given that he has a certain belief depends upon what
else he believes, what he wants, and so forth.64 That is old news, and it has been
said in this connection before (Fodor, 2003, pp. 105–6).65 My point is just that
how Barney behaves also depends upon how his mental states are formally related
to one another—and that invoking such formal relations does not undermine the
explanatory ambitions of intentional psychology.
Objection You earlier quoted a remark from Block to the effect that it’s
essential that we figure out how to type conceptual roles. Part of Block’s point
is that we need to know how to type beliefs inter-personally if there are to be
any psychological laws worth stating. But your view, I take it, is that there is no
way to type beliefs inter-personally except in terms of their content. Fred’s belief
that Phosphorous is a planet is of the same psychological type as Barney’s belief
that Phosphorous is a planet and is also of the same type as Barney’s belief that
Hesperus is a planet. Surely there is something odd about that.66
Reply It is true that, as far as their contents are concerned, the beliefs men-
tioned are of the same type. But if the worry is that there will be no psychological
laws that apply to the beliefs both Fred and Barney would express as “Hesperus is
a planet” that do not also apply to the beliefs they would express as “Phosphorous
is a planet”, it can be answered in the same way previous objections of this kind
have already been answered. Fred and Barney are in other respects cognitively
similar. Both of them, for example, might be inclined, when they acquire the belief
they would express as “Hesperus is a planet”, to make a simple inference and thus
to acquire the belief they would express as “The brightest object in the evening
sky is a planet”. That is because they both have the belief they would express as
64 It is this insight that is behind the proposals we discussed in section 2.1. But it was not properly
implemented there.
65 Indeed, the point really goes back to Putnam’s criticisms of behaviorism (Putnam, 1975).
66 Something like this objection is pushed by Bradley Rives (2009, §3).
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“Hesperus is the brightest object in the evening sky”, and because these beliefs are
formally related to one another in the obvious ways.67
The mere fact that Fred and Barney both have a belief they could express that
way does not show that those beliefs have a content more fine-grained than < Venus,
being a planet >. Frege, of course, wanted to regard the shared belief that Hesperus
is the brightest object in the evening sky as partly determinative of the content
of the singular concept Hesperus. Now it would be wrong to saddle Fregeans—
indeed, wrong even to saddle Frege (Dummett, 1981, ch. 5)—with the description
theory of names. The general idea is simply that the content of a singular concept
is determined by certain of the beliefs in which it is deployed or by certain of the
inferences in which it is involved. But, as Fodor (1998) has emphasized and as
Quine (1953) was the first to argue, the problem is to say which such beliefs serve
to determine the finer-grained content and which do not, and no-one, so far as I
know, has an adequate answer to that question. Or rather: The only acceptable
answers seem to be “All” and “None”, and the former leads to a form of semantic
holism that has no hope of answering the sort of objection we are considering.68
Objection But if beliefs are typed inter-personally only by content, then
you are committed to regarding Fred and twin-Fred as sharing no singular beliefs.
It will then be a challenge to explain the many commonalities in their behavior.
That is: You have a problem with Twin Earth.
Reply My response to this objection is similar to my response to the last one.
I would endorse what I take to be a fairly common idea nowadays,69 namely, that,
although Fred and twin-Fred do not share their singular beliefs, there are nonethe-
less many non-singular beliefs that they do share, and their common behavior can
be explained in terms of their sharing those non-singular beliefs. The crucial point
is that this ‘common behavior’ has to be described in general rather than singular
terms: When the behavior is described in singular terms, there is no commonality
to be explained. And if the behavior is described in general terms, then it is plau-
sible enough that it can also be explained in terms of general beliefs, and Fred and
twin-Fred share lots of general beliefs.
There are all kinds of problems with this view (Segal, 2000b), but my focus
67 Admittedly, there is a kind of awkwardness here. I can’t say that Fred and Barney both believe
that Hesperus is the brightest object in the evening sky, at least, not without relying more than I
should upon the language we use to describe those beliefs. Note, however, that it does not follow
that “Fred and Barney both believe that Twain has died” will be true so long as both Fred and Barney
have a belief with the content < Twain, having died >. To think it did would again be to confuse belief
with belief-attribution.
68 Since no two people share all their beliefs, no two people will share any of their beliefs.
69 The idea has its origin, for me, in Evans (1985). Peacocke (1993) developed it in ways that made
it compelling.
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here hasn’t been on Twin Earth. I’ve just been trying to argue that Frege cases
don’t refute the view that psychological content is Russellian. So, yes, it may be
that the need to explain the sorts of commonalities mentioned will require some
notion of narrow content. I doubt it, but it’s a different issue.
4.3 Semantics and Validity
Objection You have been speaking throughout of the contents of beliefs as
Russellian propositions. But why not simply regard them as sets of possible worlds?
Could one not defend that view in essentially the same way you have defended
your favored view, by invoking formal relations between mental states? Worse:
Couldn’t the psycho-Fregean view be defended in much the same way you have
defended the naïve theory? We could regard the content of a belief as being its
truth-value and deal with the objections to that view the same way you deal with
Frege cases: By appealing to formal relations between belief-states.70
Reply It would be no comfort to the Fregean if I were wrong and the friends
of possible worlds were right, so, from our present point of view, that is a sectarian
dispute. It would be a problem if the psycho-Fregean view could be defended along
similar lines: That would seriously call into doubt whether content plays any role
in psychological explanation.
But the psycho-Fregean cannot mimic the account I’ve offered. Consider, for
example, this explanation:
Fred had a belief b1 with the content < Clemens, having died >; Fred
also had a belief b2 with the content < Clemens, =, his neighbor >;
these beliefs were formally related via their respective first terms. He
was therefore able to infer the belief with the content < his neighbor,
having died >, where this belief is formally related to b1 via their sec-
ond terms and to b2 via their the first and last terms, respectively.
If we try to adapt this pattern on behalf of the psycho-Fregean, we get something
like the following:
Fred had a belief b1 with the content Falsity;71 Fred also had a belief b2
with the content Truth; these beliefs were formally related via. . . what?
He was therefore able to infer a belief with the content Falsity, where
this belief is formally related to b1 via. . . what? and to b2 via. . . what?
70 Fine (2010, p. 482) presses a similar objection against an appeal Soames (2010, pp. 472–73)
makes to logical form.
71 For present purposes, we assume that the rumors of Clemens’s demise were greatly exaggerated.
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The problem is that there is not enough structure in the ‘contents’ of these beliefs
for us to state how they are formally related. The really crucial point here is one
made earlier. We could, of course, use the sentences “Clemens has died”, “Clemens
is Fred’s neighbor”, and “Fred’s neighbor has died” to identify the contents of
Fred’s beliefs. For example, if we were to suppose with Frege that sentences name
their truth-values, then we could state the explanation as follows:
Fred had a belief b1 with the content Clemens has died (i.e., the con-
tent snow is green); Fred also had a belief b2 with the content Clemens
is Fred’s neighbor (i.e., the content pigs are mammals). These beliefs
were formally related in ways suggested by the language used in stat-
ing their contents, and so Fred was able to infer a belief with the con-
tent Fred’s neighbor has died (i.e., grass is pink), which was related
to b1 and b2 in ways again suggested by the language used in stating
their contents.
The difficulty is that the reference to ‘the language used in stating their contents’
makes the theory overly sensitive to the language used in stating the law, as the
parenthetical re-statements make clear. If the content Clemens has died is the con-
tent snow is green, then substitution of the one of these phrases for the other cannot
make a difference to the truth of the law being stated,72 and yet it clearly would,
since it actually makes it unintelligible. The contrast with my view should be clear:
On my view, beliefs are inferentially related with respect to aspects of their con-
tent, and what relations do or do not obtain can be, and has been, stated in ways
that are independent of the language used in saying what those contents are.
It should be clear that a similar objection applies to the possible worlds ap-
proach. On that view, the contents of beliefs are certain sets, and the formal re-
lations that obtain between different beliefs cannot be stated in terms of relations
between those sets, since the sets too lack the requisite structure. I’ll leave devel-
opment of the point as an exercise.
Objection The formal relations between beliefs can be stated in other
terms. Indeed, these other terms are obvious. Beliefs need only be regarded as
having ‘global logical forms’, in Taschek’s (1998) sense, and then the formal rela-
tions between beliefs can be stated in terms of them. Fred’s belief b1, for example,
can be regarded as having the logical form D(c); his belief b2, the logical form
c = the N; and then the beliefs are related in virtue of the fact that they share an
element of their logical forms. So the psycho-Fregean, for example, could say:
72 Unless, of course, these phrases occur in intensional contexts. But these phrases are supposed
to be referring to the contents of Fred’s beliefs, not expressing them, whence the context is not
intensional but extensional.
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Fred had a belief b1 with content Falsity and the logical form D(c); a
belief b2 with content Truth and logical form c = the N; these beliefs
are formally related in virtue of the shared element of their logical
form; so Fred was able to infer a belief with content Falsity and the
logical form D(the N).
Why doesn’t that work?
Reply Because the reference to the content of Fred’s belief, in the last clause
of the explanation, is completely gratuituous. In this particular case, the fact that
Fred’s new belief is false can indeed be inferred from what we know about the
truth-values of his prior beliefs: If D(c) is false and c = the N is true, then D(the N)
will be false. But that is a special case. If c = the N is false, then the truth-value of
D(the N) is independent of that of D(c).
So change the example slightly. Suppose that Barney’s belief b2 was not true
but false. Then, while we can still explain why Barney was in a position to infer
a belief with the logical form D(the N), we are in no position to decide what the
truth-value of this belief might be. The psycho-Fregean therefore has no way to
answer the question why Barney was in a position to form the belief he did: one
with content Truth and the logical form D(the N), and this is so even if content is
understood as the psycho-Fregean would have us understand it.
Similar problems arise for the possible worlds theorist. The problem in this
case is that the set of worlds in which D(the N) is true is not determined by the set
of worlds in which D(c) is true and the set of worlds in which c = the N is true.
So the possible worlds theorist cannot answer the question why Barney formed the
belief he did: one whose content was a certain set of worlds and whose logical
form was D(the N), and this is so even if content is understood as the possible
worlds theorist would have us understand it.73 So the possible worlds theorist
cannot simply take over the solution I’ve given on behalf of the naïve theorist.74
73 It’s crucial that the inference involves something besides propositional inference. Those sorts
of inferences can be explained on the possible worlds view, because sets of possible worlds form
a Boolean algebra. The technical point amounts simply to the observation that sets of worlds to
do not form a so-called cylindrical algebra—these are usually credited to Tarski (Monk, 1986, pp.
902ff)—that being what one would need to explain quantificational inferences.
74 There is an objection that can be (and has been) made to my claim that different sorts of mental
states may have different sorts of content (Heck, 2007a) that is entirely parallel to the objection
we have been discussing. As I am about to explain, my view is that the sort of content a state
has reflects the sorts of inferential (or, more generally, cognitive) processes in which it does and
does not participate. The advantage to this view is that, if content is individuated in this way, then
psychological explanations can be framed entirely in terms of the contents of psychological states—
except, of course, for appeal to analogues of the present notion of ‘formal relations’. The alternative
is to say that cognitive maps, for example, do not have a special ‘topographic’ sort of content but
simply that they have sets of worlds as their contents. Psychological explanations in which such
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Still, that is merely negative, and one might yet want to know how we should
decide what kind of content beliefs have. In fact, there is a more general issue here:
how we should decide what kind of content to ascribe to states of any given kind.
I’ve discussed this question in some detail elsewhere (Heck, 2007a), however, and
do not propose to discuss it again here. But let me say quickly what I take to be
the reasons that the contents of beliefs should be individuated at least as finely as
Russellian propositions.
First, the fact that belief-states stand in certain formal relations to one another
(and not in others) is essential to our ability to explain what needs explaining in
Frege cases. I therefore take us to be licensed to regard these states as being logi-
cally articulated in a sense that should be uncontroversial. I am not saying that we
must regard beliefs as having ‘particular’ logical forms, in the sense discussed ear-
lier, let alone that we must endorse the language of thought hypothesis.75 Ascribing
logical form in this sense is simply a way of systematizing the formal relations in
which belief-states stand to one another. For example, saying that Fred’s belief that
Twain has died has the logical form φ(α)76 is a way of characterizing the formal
relations in which it stands to other beliefs. These are the same sorts of formal
relations in which his belief that Clemens has danced stands, and that is why it too
is of the form φ(α).
Second, this logical articulation is not merely syntactic but also has a semantic
aspect: Other beliefs that are formally related to Fred’s belief that Twain has died
via its α-component (if I may put it that way) share an intentional feature with
it, namely, that they too are about Twain. And this shared intentional feature is
implicated in at least some of the explanations in which these beliefs are implicated.
For example, the fact that Fred’s belief that Twain has died is about Twain might
be involved in explanations of why Fred acts toward Twain (or Twain’s body) in
certain ways.77
If so, then psychological explanations that mention Fred’s belief that Twain has
died appeal to intentional features of this belief that are determined neither by its
states figure will then appeal not just to content but also to features of the underlying representations.
But this objection can be answered in much the same way as in the text. Suppose given a map-like
representation with a certain set of worlds as its content. Now suppose a particular marker is moved
from one place on the map to another. There is simply no way to predict, given just these meager
resources, what the content of the altered map will be, and so my opponent will be unable to explain
why the rat now thinks the food is behind it.
75 Martin Davies (1992; 1998) has argued, however, that a weak form of the language of thought
hypothesis may well follow.
76 Of course, the actual form will be more complicated, in virtue of their being many more formal
relations than this simple form indicates, but the complications do not matter here.
77 The same kind of thing can be said about the φ -component: That Fred’s belief that Twain has
died is about dying is implicated in at least some explanations involving it.
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truth-value nor by the set of worlds in which it is true. That, it seems to me, is
enough to show that its content is not just a truth-value or a set of worlds: The
intentional features of the belief simply outstrip both its truth-value and the set of
worlds in which it is true. Russellian propositions are designed precisely to remedy
this problem: A Russellian proposition is just an encoding of the intentional fea-
tures we have been discussing, since it incorporates both the logical structure of the
belief and the intentional features corresponding to the elements in that structure;
that is, it encodes both the syntax of the state and the semantics of the constituents.
I suppose we could say, if someone absolutely insisted we do so, that the ‘con-
tent’ of the belief was just a set of worlds while also saying that the belief had
intentional features not determined by that set of worlds. But that would just be
a crypto-Russellian view, one that used the word ‘content’ in a way every bit as
idiosyncratic as the way crypto-Fregeans use it.
Now, to be sure, I have said nothing here to defend either of the two claims
on which this defense of the Russellian view depends. These claims, again, are:
(i) that the formal relations among beliefs are sufficiently robust to entitle us to
regard beliefs as having logical structure; and (ii) that this articulation is not merely
syntactic but has an explanatorily relevant semantic aspect. I take these claims to
be pretty plausible. But what matters in the present context is the fact that the
Fregean is in no position to object to either of them. In particular, if there are
no explanatory purposes for which it is essential to invoke intentional features of
beliefs not determined by the set of worlds in which they are true—in particular, to
invoke semantic properties of constituents of its logical form—then the Fregean is
in even worse trouble than the Russellian.
Objection Validity is fundamentally a semantic notion: Whatever A and B
may be—contents, sentences, mental representations, or what have you—whether
A entails B should not depend upon anything but their semantic properties. And
on Frege’s view, this is so: The thought that Clemens has died does not entail the
thought that Twain has died, and so it is clear enough why Fred ought not infer
the one from the other. On your view, though, the proposition that Twain has died
does entail the proposition that Clemens has died, trivially, and so it is entirely
unclear why Fred ought not infer the one from the other. You can say, if you like,
that Fred’s (token) belief that Twain has died does not entail his (token) belief that
Clemens has died, but then entailment is not a purely semantic notion, and that is
unacceptable.
Reply This objection confuses validity with inference.78 It is not in general
78 Precisely how we should understand the relation between validity and inference is a difficult
question. Gilbert Harman (1988) has claimed that the one has essentially nothing to do with the
other. I think Harman’s view more extreme than necessary, but the distinction needs respecting.
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true, on anyone’s view, that, if A entails B, then it is rational to infer B from A. For
example, Fermat’s Last Theorem is provable in so-called von Neumann–Bernays–
Gödel set theory,79 which is axiomatizable by a single sentence. Let this sentence
be NBG, and let FLT be Fermat’s Last Theorem. Then NBG entails FLT, but prior
to Wiles’s proof it would have been insane for someone who believed NBG simply
to have inferred FLT. It is a valid inference, but that does not make it a rational
one.
Given Wiles’s proof, of course, one can make such an inference, but then one
is not just inferring FLT from NBG but from FLT and the claim that FLT if NBG,
which is what Wiles’s proof establishes. We can all agree that this inference is
rational, but it cannot be the general case: That suggestion leads directly to the
regress the Tortoise uses to slow down Achilles (Carroll, 1895). So it is a nice
question what else is required of an inference, besides its validity, if it is to be ra-
tional. I obviously cannot answer this much discussed question here (or elsewhere,
for that matter).80 But it is a natural idea that the reasonableness of ‘primitive’ in-
ferences requires not just that they should be valid but also that they should satisfy
certain formal conditions. For example, it is widely agreed that inference by modus
ponens counts as reasonable, and whether an inference is an instance of modus po-
nens is determined by formal (that is, syntactic) properties of its premises and con-
clusion. Why satisfaction of such formal conditions is necessary, and whether it is
sufficient—those are the difficult questions. But they are not our questions here.
What matters for present purposes is simply that there is nothing at all novel about
the suggestion that the notion of rational inference has a syntactic component, and
I need make no stronger claim than that.
This view does differ from Frege’s. Indeed, I am tempted to suggest that it is
here that we find bedrock: What most fundamentally distinguishes Frege’s view
from mine is that he regards the validity of an inference as completely determined
by the contents of the mental states involved in the inference, whereas I do not. I
am further tempted to suggest that Frege would have regarded my view as unac-
ceptably psychologistic: Logic, he always insisted, must not concern itself in any
way with mental states. But my view is not psychologistic. Logic concerns itself
with whether an inference of a specified form is or is not valid, and that question
has nothing to do with anyone’s mental states. But it simply does not follow that the
validity of a particular inference—a particular transition between mental states—is
79 Nothing nearly so strong as NBG is needed here, but it is has the advantage that it is relatively
familiar. Colin McLarty has recently shown that the proof of FLT can be formalized in a theory that
has the same strength as simple type theory, and it is widely believed that it is in fact provable in
Peano arithmetic.
80 The exchange between Paul Boghossian (2003)and Timothy Williamson (2003) is a good place
to start.
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determined simply by the contents of the states involved. It would follow if the
contents of the premises and conclusion determined the form of the inference, but
that is precisely what I have been at pains to deny.
In this respect, the ‘semantic relationism’ of Kit Fine (2007) seems closer to
Frege’s view. Fine seems to agree with Frege that the correctness of an inference
ought to be determined by a relation between the contents involved. If contents
are Russellian, however, then the relation in question cannot supervene on intrinsic
properties of the contents, so there must be some extrinsic relation involved, as
well. On my view, by contrast, the correctness of an inference is not determined
by any relation just between contents but by a relation between representations of
those contents. But, obviously, Fine and I are in many ways thinking along the
same lines, and, technically speaking, the two frameworks are likely to be inter-
translatable. Nonetheless, the significance of the disagreement between us should
not be underestimated. It goes very deep indeed. My view is as it is because I do not
believe that the notion of content is intelligible absent some notion of a represen-
tation that has that content: something that also has non-semantic properties, such
as a sentence or a mental state. As a slogan: No representation without representa-
tions. Someone who disagrees will no doubt want to explain inference directly in
terms of propositions, and, to them, it will therefore seem as if the approach taken
here appeals to something inessential.
5 Closing
Frege’s notion of sense is multi-faceted: Sense is the content of propositional atti-
tudes; it is what determines reference; it is indirect reference; it is what is grasped
when we understand an expression; and it is much more. It is a common observa-
tion nowadays that these various roles are, at least prima facie, in tension with one
another, and anyone who wants to develop a broadly Fregean notion of sense must
decide which of these roles to preserve and which to discard.
I have argued here that the notion of sense is not needed for the solution of
Frege’s puzzle. It does not follow that the notion of sense is not needed. What does
follow is that the notion of sense cannot be motivated entirely by Frege’s puzzle,
that is, that one cannot establish a need for the notion of sense while focusing
exclusively upon its role as the content of attitudes. That this role is, at the very
least, primary has been a persistent assumption in the work of some self-described
Fregeans. It is, I can say with some authority, an assumption that is very much
in the foreground of my own discussions of sense (Heck, 1995, 2002), and this
orientation is one I take myself to have inherited from Evans. Evans does not regard
sense as determining reference in any but a trivial sense (see, for example, Evans,
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1982, §4.2); he hardly mentions the question of indirect reference; and questions
about linguistic meaning play but an insignificant role in Varieties of Reference.81
Rather, for Evans, sense is first and foremost the content of attitudes, and Frege’s
puzzle is what establishes the need for it. What other roles it might play is an open
question.
There is another tradition, however. As mentioned earlier, Peacocke charac-
terizes sense in terms of what he calls ‘possession conditions’: The content of
a concept, on his view, is determined by what is required of a thinker if s’he is
to grasp that concept. Peacocke argues that sense, so characterized, can serve as
psychological content, but he insists equally strongly on the thesis that sense de-
termines reference: Each possession condition must be paired with a ‘determina-
tion theory’ that explains how the semantic value—the reference, in a generalized
sense—of the concept is determined by its possession condition (Peacocke, 1992,
§1.3). For example, the semantic value of the concept of disjunction is supposed
to be fixed by its possession condition in virtue of the fact that there is only one
(classical) truth-function that validates the introduction- and elimination-rules for
disjunction.82 More recently, Peacocke has emphsized that, on his view, the ratio-
nality of an inferential transition “is to be philosophically explained in terms of the
nature of the intentional contents and states involved in the transition” (Peacocke,
2004, p. 52). So the sense associated with a given concept serves also to explain
the rationality of the inferences involving it, and, Peacocke argues, it does so in a
way that reveals that these inferences are fundamentally a priori.
I noted earlier that, so far as Frege’s solution to his puzzle is concerned, the
particular senses Fred associates with ‘Twain’ and ‘Clemens’ are neither here nor
there: They can be swapped without consequence. Contrast this with a position
more like Peacocke’s, on which the content of Fred’s Twain-concept would not
only determine its reference but would also be what explained the rationality of
certain basic inferences in which that concept was involved. (I do not mean to say
that Peacocke himself would subscribe to this particular view.) In retrospect, it is
easy enough to see how the description theory of names satisfied this condition—
consider, for example, the allegedly a priori status of ‘Hesperus is sometimes vis-
ible in the evening’—but, of course, the description theory has its own problems,
and few Fregeans would endorse it nowadays. Still, one lesson of the present paper
is that, if the notion of sense is to be defended, then the reference-fixing and ratio-
nalist elements are essential: Only with them in place will there be work for the
notion of sense to do that cannot be done by the sorts of formal relations to which
81 That Evans discusses language at all in Varieties sometimes seems to me an accident of intellec-
tual culture.
82 As said earlier, the possession condition for disjunction is that one accept instances of these rules
as ‘primitively compelling’ in virtue of their form.
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I have argued we must appeal in solving Frege’s puzzle.
That Frege’s own understanding of the notion of sense is shaped by his ratio-
nalism has been a theme in much of Tyler Burge’s recent work on Frege (Burge,
2005b,a). And, as we have just seen, this connection is honored in the work of
some self-described Fregeans. At least some of us have believed, however, or at
least have hoped, that the notion of sense itself could be loosed from these epis-
temological moorings and reconstructed in purely cognitive terms. If I am right,
then we were wrong.83
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